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PREFACE 
This study is concerned with the introduction of a single currency 
for the member states of the European Con::;mnities and to discuss the 
potential costs and benefits resulting from such a monetary union. The 
primary objective is to assess the cosr:s of introducing a monetary 
union in Europe through ex ante harmonization of member states monetary 
policies. A simple monetary model of exchange rate determination is 
used in the research. The purchasing power parity doctrine which is a 
part of the model is tested by spectral analysis. 
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CHAPTER I 
PURPOSES OF Al~ALYSIS 
Introduction 
The attempt in the last few decades to unify Europe through 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has stimulated this study. The 
desire for some sort of European union in not new; it was recognized 
after World War I (WWI), and reached a climax in September, 1929, when 
French Foreign Minister Briand proposed in the Assembly of the League 
of Nations at Geneva "some king of confederal bond" (une sort de lien 
confederal) between people of Europe (Vaughan, 1979, Chapters 1-4). 
However, it is after World War II (W\HI) that a host of schemes 
were put forward for the purpose of the European integration. The 
creation of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation in 1949, 
the European Payments Union in 1950, the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity in 1951, the Common Market in 1957, the Common Agricultural 
Policy in the early 1960s, the proposal for Economic and Monetary Union 
in 1970, and finally the European Monetary System in 1979 were all 
attempts to move towards economic and monetary union, which would 
ultimately lead to political union. The member countries have explicitly 
vowed to transform themselves into a politica~ entity. The approach, 
therefore, is to bring integration via an indirect strategy concentrat-
ing on economic and monetary union, compatible with the neofunctionalist 
theory of integration (see Chapter II). Monetary union is thus seen as 
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a symbol or rallying-point around which economic and political union can 
be constructed. Therefore, the drive toward monetary integration will 
appear again and again in the future despite i.ts lack of progress during 
the 1970s. Moreover, its introduction will be facilitated once the 
economic environment becomes more favorable. 
Methodology 
To investigate the economic consequences of monetary union, econo-
mists developed the theory of optimum currency areas during the 1960s. 
They asked the question, "What are the economic conditions for a group 
of countries among which it may be optimal to have fixed exchange rates 
and let a new common currency, or the existing national currencies as 
a group, float with the rest of the world?" Our approach to monetary 
union, however, is different from the optimum currency areas question. 
We believe that the attitudes of European countries are not determined 
by short-term tactical considerations, but rather a long-run objective 
toward political and economic union. Assuming that an economic union 
has to be formed, we will ask what would be the potential costs and 
benefits of using a "monetarists" strategy to help development toward 
full economi.c union. The "monetarists" strategy emphasizes a quick 
introduction of fixed exchange rates, harmonization and then unification 
in the monetary field which would oblige member states to harmonize 
their economic policies. The "economists" strategy, in contrast, insists 
on economic coordination and harmonization first, to be followed by 
exchange rate rigidity and monetary union. 
Nature of the Present Study 
The main benefit from monetary integration is that, since it 
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increases the degree of economic integration, it thereby improves the 
allocation of economic resources as markets were enlarged. (The terms 
"monetary integration" and "monetary union" are used interchangeably. 
However, one should keep in mind that monetary union is the final stage 
of the process of monetary integration.) Moreover, economic and monetary 
union increases the degree of political union which would promote a 
state of friendship and cooperation and more significantly give Europe 
super-power status. 
The main case against monetary integration is as follows: If a 
country wants to maintain both internal and external oalance it needs 
two instruments of policy. The loss of the exchange rate instrument 
would force a country to use internal policies in order to correct an 
external disequilibrium. (This possible consequence of monetary union 
can be seen in Carden, 1972; Aliber, 1972; Fleming, 1971; Magnifico, 
1971; Johnson, 1971, and Salin, 1974.) The critics argue that monetary 
integration will not work because the departure from internal balance 
will result in large-scale unemployment in some countries which would 
not be acceptable to them. 
The purpose of this research is to show that the above objection 
to monetary integration is weak. We believe that large-scale unemploy-
ment will not result as a consequence of the loss of exchange-rate 
instrument for the nations of the European Economic Community (EEC). 
(The official name was change to European Community (EC) to reflect the 
broader aspirations of the member nations.) Large-scale unemployment 
would not result because exchange rates are mainly a monetary phenomena 
and could not have a lasting effect on a real variable (unemployment). 
Indeed, if exchange rate changes could not have an effect on employment 
other than in the short run, and knowjng that the frequent use of 
use of exchange rate depreciation makes the short run always shorter, 
then the cost of the loss of the exchange rate instrument is relatively 
much less than its critics suggest. In view of sizable benefits 
resulting from monetary union and its relatively negligible cost, one 
should make a strong case for European Monetary Integration. 
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We will use a simple monetary model of exchange rate determination. 
The model is condensed to one reduced-form equation that expresses a 
functional relationship between the exchange rate and its ultimate 
determinants. Estimates of the reduced-form equation for various EC 
countries permit us to determine whether exchange rates are a monetary 
phenomenon or not. 
Plan of Study 
Chapter II reviews the historical attempts toward economic and 
monetary union since IJWII. In Chapter III, the writer examines in some 
detail the potential benefits and costs of monetary union. Chapter IV 
describes the methodology and statistical techniques to be employed. 
In particular, the researcher outlines the recent development of the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments and its implication for 
monetary union. Chapter V provides the empirical findings of the 
reduced form equation between EC countries. Chapter VI discusses the 
·existing strategy toward monetary union, namely, the coordination of 
members' economic policies through the European Honetary System. 
Chapter VII su~marizes the research and outlines the major conclusions. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROlJND 
The Postwar decades have seen a series of attempts to unify Europe. 
On June 5, 1947, in his famous address at Harvard University, George 
Marshall, the U.S. Secretary of State, proposed a substantial American 
aid to European countries (Teitgen, 1975). Marshall called for a 
European recovery program, in which all European nations would partici-
pate in a spirit of cooperation, to prepare their economic restoration. 
With a view to responding to this offer, 16 European governments 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, S~eden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and the United Kingdom [note that the Soviet bloc refused to come in]) 
opened the conference of European Econo~ic Cooperation on July 12, 1947, 
in Paris. Subsequently, a second conference of the 16 nations on 
March 15, 1948, resulted in the creation of the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). The ultimate purpose of this 
agreement was a large free trade area. 
The organization effected progress. In 1949, Eurpoean production 
figures, excepting Greece and Germany, had reached 1938 levels. In 
July of that year the members agreed on the first major reduction of 
import controls, removing 50 percent of all such restrictions from 
private trade among themselves. The expectation that the level of 
reduction would rise to 60 percent during the next 12 months was in 
some instances exceeded. A protectionist trend of more than 20 years' 
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duration, going back to the Great Depression, had finally been reversed 
(Schmitt, 1969). The importance of the Marshall Plan and the OEEC, 
through which a large part of the aid funds was channeled, cannot be 
overemphasized in a study of European integration. 
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By 1949 it was apparent that further expansion of European trade 
was being hampered by bilateral trading, and that an expansion of trade 
would require a wider multilateral basis; it was in search of this that 
further efforts were directed. The result of these efforts was the 
European Payments Union (EPU) which was formally signed on September 19, 
1950. Although EPU was to serve as a system of regional multilateral 
clearing, its wider aim was to pursue the long-run goal of European 
economic integration (Scammell, 1961). 
However, the problem with EPU was that is was restricted to Europe. 
Creditor countries had an incentive to discriminate in favor of pur-
chases inside the EPU while encouraging exports to non-EPU countries 
in order to avoid granting automatic credits. Another move toward 
unification was the creation of the Council of Europe on May 5, 1949. 
This Council was to comprise a consultative assembly i.n Strasbourg, 
whose members were appointed by the parliament or government of each 
country, and a ministerial committee in Brussels composed of the 
foreign ministers of the member states. The Council would harmonize 
views and form recommendations on all but defense matters, but it would 
be without any legislative power and without any executive responsibility. 
This Assembly did, however, serve as the great forum in which the future 
shape of a united Europe was debated. 
The European Options 
By late 1950, as a result of these attempts to unify Europe, there 
were significant differences over goals. Essentially, the controversy 
was between rebuilding and transcending the nation state. Cutting 
across controversies over goals were differences over strategies which 
separated the economic from the political determinists. The result, as 
suggested by Figure 1, was four rather distinct approaches to postwar 
problems. 
(/) 
Q) 
•r1 
co 
(I) 
.µ 
(!j 
H 
.µ 
(/) 
Political 
determinism 
Economic 
determinism 
Goals 
Transcend the Rebuild the 
nation-state nation-state 
Figure 1. The European Approaches 
According to Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) the rebuilders were 
preoccupied, first and foremost, with the massive destruction of WWII, 
and they felt that the most effective way to reconstruct would be 
through the nation-state. To the transcenders, re-establishment of 
the old order would be little more than the prelude to a new round of 
destruction; the simple lesson of the 20th century seemed to be that 
the nation-state was no longer visable--economically, militarily, or 
politically. 
The controversy over strategy was the conflict between economic 
determinism and political determinism. In the heart of economic 
determinism lies the functionalist approach: In order to control 
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international conflict and promote welfare at a world scale, the 
functionalists proposed the creation of various international agencies 
for cooperative solutions to social and economic problems (Haas, 1964, 
Chapter 1). 
The functional appraoch is, in general, compatible with the 
continued existence of nation-state, since it calls for no more than 
cooperative solutions to common problems, making this approach very 
appealing to those who wished to rebuild the nation-state and saw the 
primary obstacles as economic. According to Lindberg and Scheingold 
(1970), there was, in addition, a second brand of functionalism which 
they referred to as neofunctionalism. According to them, neofunction-
alism differs from traditional functionalism in that it established 
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some prerequisites to effective problem solving which involve a partial, 
but direct, threat to the autonomy of the nation-state. Specially, it 
is argued that one must begin with a real delegation of decision-making 
authority to a supranational agency. 
Neofunctionalists believed in their approach to a logic of 
integration. Very briefly, the neofunctionalist reasoning is: Since 
economic problems are interconnected, any solution of a problem by 
supranational agency, once started, would lead to another one, so that 
the process has a cumulative character, thus leading gradually to 
·deprevation of autonomy for nation-state; thus, this approach attracted 
those who wished to transcend the nation-state and, on the other, those 
who were inclined to think of economic problems as determinant. 
The political determinists were inclined to believe that coopera-
tion on noncontroversial problems could lead no further than to 
peaceful resolution of noncontroversial issues. However, within this 
general strategy, there were divisions between the transcenders and the 
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rebuilders. For example, the transcenders represented by the European 
Union of Federalists advocated a program of achieving the political 
federation of Europe through continuous contact and liaison with 
ministers and parliaments (Haas, 1968). They argued that the OEEC or 
the Council of Europe should be vested with certain strong central 
powers at the outset through which they could allocate economic goods 
among their members. For them, some kind of U.S. of Europe was the 
most desirable goal. 
The rebuilders, on the other hand, did not sympathize with the 
idea of transfer of authority from nation-state to some "high authority" 
on a European level. However, they advocated political cooperation 
between governments to solve any controversial issues. Thus Figure 2 
shows the European options after filling the four cells of the matrix 
of Figure 1. 
Goals 
Transcend the Rebuild the 
nation-state nation-state 
Political Federalists Nationalists 
determinism (U.S. of Europe) (Confederation) 
Economic Neo-functionalist Functionalist 
determinism (economic (free trade) integration) 
Figure 2. The European Options 
However, as Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) have pointed out, the 
orderly positioning within the four cells is clearly an exercise of 
hindsight. Yet it seems incontestable that these are in general the 
positions that emerged between the end of the war and 1950. 
In view of the above classification, we can then say that the 
creation of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation was an 
economic approach, and the creation of the Council of Europe was a 
political approach, to European unification. 
The Schuman Plan 
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In May, 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in a 
famous declaration made in the name of his government, proposed that 
France and Germany subject their entire coal and steel production to a 
single, supranational authority (Teitgen, 1975). Membership was to 
remain open to all other European countries which might wish to partici-
pate and would be willing to meet the terms of the agreement. .The 
Schuman Plan prepared by Jean Monnet was a radical step in that it was 
the first proposition in which governments would surrender important 
powers to a new supranational body (Bromberger, 1969). Quickly the plan 
was approved by Germany, Italy, and the Benelax countries. Britian, 
however, refused to accept Schuman's supranational principle, which 
would have removed control of key industries from the sphere of national 
jurisdiction. According to Schmitt (1962) although it was a Labor 
government which assumed responsibility for this refusal, it reflected 
an attitude shared by Britons of all political hues. 
The British refusal, according to Teitgen (1975), was a momentous 
time for a choice fraught with consequences: Should the very principle 
of integration be sacrificed to ensure British participation? With the 
approval of the governmerit, Schuman let it be known that there could be 
no question of this. The dies were cast; "L'Europe des sixtt was coming 
to birth. 
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On April 18, 1951, the final draft of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) was signed by the six foreign ministers and on August 10 
of the following year, the treaty took effect. It is not the purpose of 
this study to go into the details of the articles of the treaty; 
Article 9 is reproduced below only in order to emphasize the surpa-
national character of ECSC. 
ARTICLE 9: The High Authority shall be composed of nine 
members designated for six years and chosen for their general 
competence. A member shall be eligible for reappointment. 
The number of members of the High Authority may be reduced 
by unanimous decision of the council. Only nationals of 
member states may be members of the High Authority. The 
High Authority shall not include more than two members of 
the same nationality. The members of the High Authority 
shall exercise their functions in complete independence in 
the general interest of the Community. In the fulfillment 
of their duries, they shall neither solicit nor accept 
instructions from any government or from any organization. 
They will abstain from all conduct incompatible with the 
supranational character of their functions. Each member 
state undertakes to respect this supranational character 
and not to seek to influence the members of the High 
Authority in the execution of their duties. The members 
of High Authority shall not exercise any business or 
professional activities, paid or unpaid, nor acquire or 
hold, directly or indirectly, any interest in any business 
related to coal and steel during their term of office or 
for a period of three years thereafter (Weil, 1965, p. 15). 
The treaty also provided for a Council of Ministers, consisting of 
ministers from six member states of the Community whose function, 
according to treaty, was to assist the High Authority in carrying out 
its task. 
As a result of establishment of the common market for coal and 
steel, the volume of trade in ECSC products rose by 93 percent between 
1952 and 1955, '~ile the increase in trade i~ all other sectors liberal-
ized under the OEEC Code, but not under the common market, amounted to 
only 59 percent in the same period (ECSC, 1956). By 1956 the community 
felt that it could claim that it had fulfilled one of the major 
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objectives which has been assigned to it and could be served as a model 
for future attempts at supranational integration in the economic world, 
thereby opening the way politically for the negotiations which resulted 
in the following year in the signature of the Treaties of Rome and the 
establishment of the General Common Market and Euratom. 
The Common Market 
On March 24, 1957, representatives of France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany 
signed the Treaty of Rome, and on January 1, 1958, the EEC came into 
being. The Rome Treaty, however, was a consequence of the limitation 
of the ECSC which was a one-dimensional approach to economic integra-
tion. A wider scope than ECSC was needed. The Treaty of Rome, which 
established a general Common Market, was thus a logical consequence of 
the success of ECSC. 
Objectives of the Treaty 
Article 2 sets the aim of establishing a Common Market and pro-
gressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to 
promote throughout the community a harmonious development of economic 
activities. 
Article 3 aims at (a) elimination, as between Member States, 
of customs duties and of quantitative restrictions in 
regard to the importation and exportation of goods, as well 
as of all other measures with equivalent effect. (b) Estab-
lishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial 
policy tow3.cd third countries. (c) Abolition of the 
obstacles to the free movement of persons, services, and 
capital. (d) Inauguration of a common Agricultural Policy 
(Weil, 1965, p. 13). 
Being interested specifically in European monetary integration, 
this study will not go into the details of the articles but will quote 
those which are related to monetary integration. 
Article 103 is on economic policy and states that economic trends 
are a matter of common interest and therefore member states should 
consult with each other and with the Commission on measures to be 
taken in response to current circumstances. 
Article 104: Each member state shall pursue the economic 
policy necessary to ensure the equilibrium of its overall 
balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its 
currency while ensuring a high level of employment on the 
stability of the level of prices. 
Article 105: In order to facilitate the attainment of the 
objectives stated in Article 104, member states shall 
coordinate economic policies. They shall for this purpose 
institute a collaboration between the competent services 
of their administrative departments and between their 
central banks. The Commission shall submit to the Council 
recommendations for the briPging into effect of such 
collaboration. In order to promote the coordination of 
the policies of member states in rr.onetary matters to full 
extent necessary for the functi,Jnjng of the Common Market 
a Monetary Committee with consultative status shall 
thereby be established with the following tasks: 
- to keep under review the monetary and financial 
situation of Member States and of the Community 
and also the general payments system of Member 
States and to report regularly thereon to the 
Council and to the Commission; and 
- to formulate opinions, at the request of the 
council or to the Cormnission or on its own 
initiative, for submission to the said 
institutions. 
The Member States and Commission shall each appoint two 
members of the Monetary Committee (Weil, 1965, p. 42). 
Article 107 states that the exchange rate should be treated as a 
matter of common concern. Article 108 envisages the possibility of 
mutual aid in case of serious difficulties in the balance of payments. 
As regard capital movement, Article 67 states that to the extent 
13 
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necessary for proper functioning of the Com111on Market, capital movement 
restrictions should progressively be abolished. 
Finally, Article 130 envisages the establishment of the European 
Investment Bank which would facilitate the financing of the following 
projects: aid in the development of the less developed regions, the 
conversion and modernization of enterprises in cases where the 
necessary funds cannot be supplied by a particular member nation, and 
projects of common interest to several members, such as large highways, 
tunnels, and bridges. 
Having quoted the most relevant articles concerning economic and 
monetary integration, we will briefly describe the institutional 
setting of EEC. 
Similarly to ECSC, the EEC consists of a European Commission whose 
members act independently of individual Nation-States (duties and 
responsibilities of the Commission are set in Article 155 of the 
Treaty). There is also the Council of Ministers whose task would be 
consultation among the member government and the coordination of their 
policies (duties and responsibilities of the Council of Ministers are 
set in Article 145 of the Treaty). Again we see two kinds of insti-
tutions, one independent from individual Nation-State, the other 
responsible to individual Nation-State; one based on functionalist 
approach and the other on federalist approach. There would also be a 
Court of Justice with powers to cover all Common Market matters. The 
last institution is the European Parliament, which would be linked 
with the parliaments of member states and would review and measure 
community policies year by year. (For more detail of institutional 
setting, see De la Mahotiere, 1970.) 
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Common Agricultural Policy 
The major goal of abolishing all tariffs and other trade restric-
tions among themselves, which was programmed in detail in the Rome 
Treaty, was successfully completed by July, 1968, sooner than was 
originally planned. The Treaty also established principles and 
guidelines for a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). (Jhese principles 
and guidelines can be found in Articles 38 to 48.) The CAP was designed 
to protect farmers within each member country by imposing some kind of 
import restrictions on many farm products. To assure satisfactory 
stable farm income, a system of "target" prices and "intervention" 
prices was introduced. The target prices of wholesale trade are set 
from year to year and actual market prices tend to move somewhere 
between the two levels which have a spread from 5 to 10 percent from 
target price. Thus, these small variations around the target prices 
determine the intervention prices, the minimum price at which commodities 
are bought wholesale to maintain the price floor, and maximum price at 
which commodities are sold wholesale from official stocks to maintain 
the ceiling price. If we subtract the cost of shipping the product 
from the port of entry to the main consuming area, we obtain the 
"threshold" price. The difference between the c.i.f. (cost, insurance, 
freight) import price and the threshold price is imposed on the former 
as an import levy, and to the extent that the prices at which import 
shipments are offered vary at the community frontier, the levy also 
varies. In this manner, the variable import levy has replaced the 
usual system of customs duties and quotas for target-price farm 
commodities (Feld, 1979; Kreinin, 1975). 
16 
However, as a result of political power of the farmers, agricultural 
lobbies were very strong in all European parliaments and it became clear 
that when the Commission had a decision to make on a single common price 
for any product, it would be forced to establish a price very near the 
highest existing price for that product, rather than take the average 
of all prices. So high prices were to be the order of the day; this 
was to lead to gross over-production, all of which had to be paid for 
out of a European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), 
and, to iron out the difference between the high Common Market price 
and the low world price, export subsidies or negative levies would have 
to be very high--another heavy burden for the EAGGF and another cause 
of bitter dissention when it became clear that the surplus-producing 
countries, mainly France, were easily getting the best of the deal, 
since the EAGGF was paying out to them far more than they put in. 1 
The maintenance of high agricultural support prices is not the 
only cost which the members of the EEC must bear in support of the 
farmers; fluctuations among the member countries currencies are also 
highly costly, and amounted to nearly $2 billion in 1976. As the EEC 
neared the end of the transition period, December 31, 1969, it was 
obvious that the whole edifice of the CAP was in danger of collapsing. 
The devaluation of the franc and revaluation of the D-mark had 
weakened the carefully erected but unsoundly based common price system. 
For example, when in August, 1969, France devalued the franc by 11.1 
percent with target prices unchanged (expressed in dollars), the new 
franc parity implied a proportionate rise in the franc prices of 
agricultural products, thus encouraging Frencl1 farmers to expand 
production at the expense of, say, German farmers who were in a less 
favorable competitive position as a result of French devaluation. Thus, 
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French devaluation upset the hard-fought compromise target price of 
soft wheat ($106.25 per metric ton) and the Council of Ministers had to 
establish a new one: it was that France would increase the franc price 
of wheat in two stages over a two-year period and, in the interim, was 
required to levy broader taxes on wheat exported to other members and 
to subsidize imports from other members. This solution involved not 
only a departure from common prices but also a temporary nullification 
of one of the primary purposes of the franc devaluation--to improve the 
trade balance by increasing exports and reducing imports (Ingram, 1973). 
If total disintegration of the CAP were to be avoided, very serious 
thought indeed would have to be given to the monetary relationships 
between the EEC countries. 
The Treaty of Rome was nowhere more discreet than in its references 
to harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies and did little more, 
in fact, than provide for the establishment of a Monetary Committee. 
Thus, it was felt in the early stages of the European Economic 
Community, that there was a need for more monetary cooperation to 
redress the imbalance which was found in the Treaty of Rome. Thus, on 
June 19, 1963, the Commission submitted to the Council the recommenda-
tion on collaboration in monetary and financial matters in the Common 
Market accounced in the Action Program, which proposed first the 
establishment of a special committee of governors of national banks 
of the six member states--which would eventually lead to an organiza-
tion similar to the Federal Reserve System in the United States; 
second, the institution of an agreed on and defined consultation 
procedure at the level of finance ministers or of governors of the 
national banks to discuss all matters of major financial concern or 
interest, such as variations in bank rate, decisions relating to 
18 
minimum liquidity ratios, etc.; and third, the formulation of a common 
community attitude in major international fin.:mcial institutions and 
discussions (i.e., IMF) (Weil, 1965). 
The Commission's Action Program, rather modest, did not receive a 
warm welcome by the various EEC governments. Also, in 1963 the Community 
faced its first monetary crisis which marked the end of an uninterrupted 
honeymoon period of almost five years. France and Italy were faced with 
strong inflationary pressures which resulted in a balance of payment 
crisis in the latter country in 1964. This led to an inflow of funds 
to Federal Republic because of expectations of the revaluation of the 
Deutsche-mark; and according to Tsoukalis (1977) the crisis of 1963-64 
created a more favorable climate for the adoption of the Commission's 
proposals of June, 1963. Thus, in Hay, 1964, the Council of Ministers 
set up the Committee of Governors of Central Banks and a budgetary 
policy committee consisting of senior officials from national ministries 
of finance, as well as representatives of the Commission. In addition, 
there was agreement not only on parity change consultation but also on 
broader prior consultations on all international monetary problems. 
However, during 1963-68 there was no significant progress in the 
monetary field which, according to Bloomfield (1973) seemed to reflect 
the continuing payments surpluses and mounting reserves of individual 
member countries. 
Although there was little progress in monetary field during these 
years, the Commission had stressed the need for a fuller coordination 
of monetary and financial policy as stated in the General Report. 
One result of growing interpenetration of the economies of 
the member countries in the European Communities has been 
the increasingly marked interdependence of national 
monetary and financial trends. Experience in recent yea:rs 
shows that integration has progressed to such a point that 
the achievement of the economic objectives of each of the 
Member States is now to a great extent dependent on the 
economic trends in the partner countries. The consequence 
of this process of integration is that there is a need for 
fuller coordination of monetary and financial policies 
(EEC Commission, 1968, p. 124). 
Also, monetary coordination was on the European Parliament's agenda, 
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which concluded, at its session of November 28 to December 2, 1966, the 
adoption of a resolution of the community's future activities in the 
field of monetary policy and the creation of a European monetary union 
(Bulletin of the European Communities, January 1967). The fortur!.ate 
situation of general balance of payments surplus among the member states 
did not last very long. In 1968-69 there was a monetary crisis 
involving mainly France and Germany. In the wake of the French politi-
cal crisis of Hay, 1968, a sharp loss of confidence caused a substantial 
flight of capital from France which brought about the introduction of 
exchange controls in France and led to a speculative crisis associated 
with expectations of a devaluation of the French franc. 
The pressures on the French franc were compounded in the fall of 
1968 by rumors of a possible revaluation of the German mark. Because 
of this speculative atmosphere, the principal European foreign exchange 
markets were closed while an emergency meeting of the Group of Ten was 
held in Bonn in November of the same year. During this meeting, the 
French joined the U.S. and British representatives in exerting pressure 
on the Germans to obtain a revaluation of the deutchemark. Given the 
importance of exports for the German postwar economic performance and 
also given the po·litical strength of the export sector, the Germans 
defied the pressure exercised upon them by the Big Three in favor of 
a revaluation of the deutschmark. The French likewise ruled out a 
devaluation of the French franc and opted in favor of a more restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policy and even more severe exchange restrictions. 
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So the anticipated revaluation of the German mark and devaluation of the 
French franc did not materialize. 
When the foreign exchange markets reopened, there was a short calm 
period which did not last long. Speculative pressures against the franc 
and in favor of the mark were very intense in the beginning of 1969, and 
they ultimately resulted on August 8 in the franc devaluation by 11.1 
percent against the dollar. Also, the Germans decided in September, 
1969, to let the mark float for a short period. The mark jumped 
immediately, and by the end of October a new revaluated parity was 
established, up by 9.29 percent against the dollar. 
The crisis of 1968-69 provided a strong driving force toward 
increased monetary cooperation in the EEC, and of course it is this 
1968 monetary crisis which gave the kick-off to elaborate discussion on 
definition and implementation of the so-called economic and monetary 
union (EMU) (Maillet, 1976). 
The Barre Plan 
It became clear to the members of EC that the events of 1968-69 
could not be permitted to recur in the future, for they severely 
strained trading relationships and defeated the purpose of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. As one alternative, the EC members opposed the 
establishment of a more flexible exchange rate system, which was 
advocated by American economists, and was being considered by IMF as a 
replacement for the Bretton Woods system. Many European leaders felt 
that the adoption of a more flexible exchange rate system would ulti-
mately destroy the EC itself. The Commission came up, in February, 
1969, with a memorandum on the coordination of eccnomi.c policies 
and on monetary coordination within the community--the so-called Barre 
Plan (Supplement to Bulletin of the European Communities, March 1969). 
In terms of concrete proposals, the plan contained four main elements: 
1. Member states' commitment not to alter their parity rates 
without prior common agreement. 
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2. The elimination of margins of fluctuation between member states' 
monies and adoption of identical margins in regard to a third 
country. 
3. The establishment of some kind of machinery in the community 
for mutual assistance, for example, the formation of a system 
of short-term and medium-term monetary support and assistance. 
4. Finally, the plan called for a greater convergence and 
compatability between national economic objectives. Thus, the 
system of prior consultation should be extended to all economic 
policy decisions which could have an influence on other 
community members' economies. 
The second Barre Plan, submitted in December, 1969, envisaged a 
three-stage process leading to economic and monetary union by 1978; 
it again advocated that the six member countries should gradually 
narrow their exchange rate margins, coordinate their economic and 
monetary policies, harmonize their taxes and establish a machinery 
for mutual balance of payments assistance. 
The desire to move toward an economic and monetary union, and the 
Barre initiatives, could not prevent the monetary crisis of 1968-69 
which ended with 'a devaluation of the French franc in August, 1969, 
followed by a revaluation of the D-mark in October of the same year. 
Both decisions, the French devaluation and the German revaluation, 
were not preceded by consultations within the com:nunity, despite the 
obligation undertaken by all member countries in Hay, 1964, and 
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furthermore, despite the fact that the system of prior consultations had 
been extended less than a month before the French devaluation. 
When the French devalued the franc in August, 1969, France had to 
pay 11.11 percent levies on agricultural exports to other member states. 
Another serious situation arose when the mark was allowed to float and 
jumped immediately by 9 percent against the dollar. Germany was 
threatened with a flood of agricultural imports and the German govern-
ment imposed border taxes of 8.5 percent without consulting her partners 
(De la Mahotiere, 1970). 
By December 31, 1969, the transitional period envisaged in the 
Treaty of Rome was to be terminated. And with the exchange crisis of 
1969 and the subsequent flaw in the CAP, the time was appropriate for 
advances on other fronts to maintain the momentum already achieved and 
even to avoid retrogression. To many European leaders, the logical 
course was a drive to full economic and monetary union. 
Formal and informal discussion continued throughout the year and 
culminated in the summit conference of community heads of state at the 
Hague on December 1-2, 1969. Consensus seemed to be that the members 
should now declare their determination to proceed to, and undertake, 
the first steps toward full economic and monetary union. At the end of 
the conference it was agreed among other things that during 1970 the 
Council draw up a plan, based on the Barre Plan, to establish by stc1ges 
an economic and monetary union in the community. On March 6, 1970, the 
Council turned this task over to a committee, headed by Pierre Werner of 
Luxembourg. In the interim, community cnetral banks agreed to establish 
a system of short-term monetary support among member central banks with 
$2 billion being made available for a period of up to three months to 
nations experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties. 
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The Werner Report 
The Report of the Werner Group submitted in 1970, laid down a 
program for the establishment by stages of an Economic and Monetary 
Union (EHU) by 1980 (Supplement to Bulletin of the European Communities, 
July and November, 1970). This gradual approach was based on the 
neofunctionalist theory of integration which characte_rized the European 
approach to unification from its beginning (Werner, 1977). The coal and 
steel market could not subsist by itself and induced the search for an 
integration of all economic sectors in the Common Market: the conunon 
agricultural policy involving a unique market and unique prices brought 
out the drawbacks of the absence of monetary cooperation in the 
community. 
In order td discern the full political consequences of this 
approach, the Werner Group first described very precisely and clearly 
the possible final state of the union. At the final state this union 
involves either the establishment of a single common European currency, 
or the irrevocable fixing of parities among participating European 
currencies. Technically, the choice between the two systems would 
appear to be unimportant. However, psychological and political consider-
ations would strongly support the adoption of a single currency, thus 
guaranteeing the irreversibility of the action. 
Some other consequences of such union would be: 
1. The creation of liquidity in the entire community, and 
monetary and credit policies would cs centralized. 
2. There would be a community monetary policy vis-a-vis the rest 
of the world. 
3. Member states would unify their policies on capital markets. 
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4. The main components of budget policy--especially the volume, 
and the size of the budget surplus and the method of financing 
a deficit--would be decided at the community level. 
5. Regional and structural policies would no longer be exclusively 
the domain of member states. 
6. Trade unions and employers' organizations would be systemati-
cally and continuously consulted at the community level. 
As a result of these steps, the completion of economic and monetary 
union would require the creation or the transformation of a number of 
community organs, to which certain functions hitherto exercised by 
national authorities would have to be transferred. The Werner Report 
said that these transfers of responsibility would represent a process 
of fundamental political significance, implying the progressive 
development of political cooperation. Economic and monetary union 
would thus appear as an unavoidable stimulus to political union in the 
long run. According to Werner (1977), the Werner Report was representa-
tive of two schools of thought on union, the "Monetarist" and the 
"economist". The distinction between the two approaches to monetary 
union is the ordering of events in the process of monetary union. The 
"monetarists" insist on a quick imposition of fixed exchange rates, 
harmonization and then unification in the monetary field which would 
·oblige member states to harmonize their economic policies. The 
"economists", in contrast, emphasize economic coordination and harmoni-
zation first, to be followed by exchange rate rigidity and monetary 
union. The main protagonists in this debate were France and Germany. 
France was eager for a more rigid fixing of exchange rates within the 
community to preserve the common agricultural policy of which it was 
the main beneficiary. The Germans, on the other hand, were in favor of 
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the "economist" approach of the coordination of the economic and growth 
policies of the individual member states. To reconcile the two schools 
of thought, the Werner Report stressed the principle of parallelism: 
simultaneous harmonizatior. of economic policies and monetary policies. 
The Werner Report emphasized the lack of progress in the economic 
and monetary field: that the growing interpenetration of the economies 
has weakened the independence of the short-term economic policies 
pursued in the member countries; and this loss of independence at 
national level has not been offset by the creation of community policy 
(Supplement to Bulletin of the European Communities, July 1970). The 
Report went on to point out that unless national economic policies were 
coordinated and harmonized, differences in policy preferences would lead 
to balance of payments disequilibria which would jeopardize the survival 
of the customs union and the functioning of the CAP. Moreover, policy 
divergencies had contributed to the failure of the community to assert 
itself adequately in international monetary relations. To overcome the 
above criticisms, the Werner group proposed the following: 
... measures must be adopted under a set of related headings: 
The establishment of overall economic guidelines, the 
coordination of short-term economic policies through money 
and credit arrangements, through the budget and taxation and 
through incomes policy, the adoption of community policies on 
structure, the elimination of exchange fluctuations between 
the community currencies, greater stability in parity relation-
ships, the harmonization of external monetary policy, the 
integration of capital markets, etc. All this will require 
in the first place fuller coordination of national policies, 
then their harmonization through the adoption of agreed 
directives, and lastly the transfer of responsibilities from 
the national· to the community authorities. As progress is 
gradually i::ade, Community instruments w:~ll have to be created 
to take over from or underpin the national instruments. 
In all the fields, the measures to be taken are interdependent 
and will strengthen each other; in particuJar, the development 
of monetary unification must be closely related to adequate 
progress in the coordination, and later unification, of the 
economic policies (Supplement to DuJletiu of the European 
Communities, July, 1970, p. 10). 
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In describing above the measures to be taken to achieve a European 
Monetary Union in three stages over ten years, the Werner Group only 
presented a list of measures to be adopted during the first stage ~1ich 
would last three years. It did not go on to clearly define and detail 
the second and third stages. As for the first stage, the Werner Group 
proposed the strengthening of the system of prior consultations which 
would cover medium-term economic policy, short-term economic policy, 
budgetary policy, monetary policy, etc. 
Although there were some debates within the Werner Group concerning 
the EC exchange rates system, the majority of experts favored gradually 
narrowing margins of fluctuation between EEC currencies. Moreover, in 
order to prepare the final stage, the Werner Group proposed the estab-
lishment of a European Fund for Monetary Cooperation as soon as possible, 
even during the first stage; but it should have to come at the latest 
during the second stage. The Fund could serve as an organi~ation to 
coordinate the foreign exchange activities of its members, to extend 
short-term and medium-term monetary support. The amount and basis of 
credit to be available through the Fund was not fully determined and 
could undergo a progressive evolution toward a pooling of reserves at 
the Community level; ultimately, in the final stage, it would have to 
be integrated in the "Community system for the central banks." 
The final report of the Werner Group was not substantially 
different from the first report (Supplement to Bulletin of the European 
Communities, November, 1970). The objective was again a complete 
economic and monetary union in European Community by 1980. However, 
the need for institutional reforms was mentioned in the final report. 
It was envisaged that l>y the final stage two C'rgans of the Community 
would be established, namely, the "center of decision for economic 
policy" and the "Community system for the central banks." The former 
would be politically responsible to Europeau Parliament. and would 1:iC:! 
involved with the formulation of the Community economic policy. The 
Community system for the central banks W'.tS similar to the Federal 
Reserve System in the United States. The creation of these two organs 
emphasizes the principle of parallelism or, in other words, the recon-
ciliation of the "monetarist" and "economist" approaches to monetary 
union: simultaneous progress in the field of coordination of economic 
policy and of monetary cooperation. 
The First Stage 
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In March, 1971, the Commission came up with a resolution on the 
implementation of the first stage of monetary and economic union which 
was adopted by the Council of Ministers. (For a complete survey of the 
first stage, see Tsoukalis, 1977, pp. 112-150.) For the most part, the 
Commission's proposals were in lin2 witL Werner Group's recommendation, 
but there was disagreement on institutional aspects and on transfer of 
powers from member state to the Community level which resulted in the 
introduction of a precautionary clause that would make the transition 
from first stage to second more conditional. 
Following the acceptance of initial phase of EMU (1971 to 1973 
inclusive), the central banks of the Community decided to reduce from 
June 15, 1971, intracommunity margins of fluctuation from 1.5 to 1.2 
percent on either side of parity. (Maximum permissible fluctuation 
between any two EC currencies would be reduced from 3 to 2.4 percent.) 
In addition, they established a machinery for medium-term (two to five 
years) financial assistance among members of up to $2 billion 
(Bloomfield, 1973). 
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The progress toward implementation of the first stage of EMU--most 
importantly, the narrowing of intra-EC margins of fluctuation--was 
severely damaged by international monetary crisis of Summer, 1971. The 
first jolt came on May, 1971, when large speculative short-term capital 
moved out of the United States into the European countries, which in 
turn resulted, on May 5, in the closing of foreign exchange markets in 
Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland. 
The Commission was against any revaluation of European monies 
vis-a-vis the dollar, and also against any free floating of these monies 
vis-a-vis the dollar. The Commission proposed that member countries 
affirm their absolute determination not to modify their parity and 
take concerted action to curb the inflows of funds through regulation 
of Eurodollar market. However, it was impossible to agree on a common 
formula, and on May 10, when the exchange market reopened, the German 
and the Dutch currencies were floated while capital controls were 
introduced for other EEC countries. Under these circumstances, central-
bank governors suspended their previous decision to narrow the fluctua-
tion margins of their currencies against each other from June 15, 1970. 
As Tsoukalis (1977) put it: 
The decision of the German government, in defiance of the 
opinion of its EEC partners and its own central bank, to 
float the Deutschemark was in marked contrast to the whole 
strategy on EMU and the decisions taken only two months 
before. The French decided to adopt an 'empty chair' 
policy with respect to any discussion related to EMU and 
the whole project was shelved until December, when the 
crisis was, at least temporarily, resolved. The floating 
of the Deuts'chemark was also strongly resented because of 
the disrupcive effects which it would have, as in 1969, 
on the functioning of the CAP (p. 114). 
The second jolt, more serious than the first, took place in 
August, 1971, when President Nixon announced that the dollar would 
no longer be freely convertible into gold. To cope with this new 
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ch~llenge, consultations between member countries (and with future 
members) were intense, and the monetary committee offered two solutions 
to the EEC countries: either a joint float of the member countries 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world, or a two-tier exchange market 
separating commercial rates from financial rates (Maillet, 1976). 
The six again agreed to disagree on the measures to be taken. The 
Germans and the Dutch maintained a joint float of their currencies 
(floating also was adopted by the Italians, English, Swiss, and 
Japanese). France and Belgium adopted a two-tier exchange market with 
commercial Belgian franc joining the guilder and Deutschemark in the 
common float and the introduction by France of a tight exchange control. 
Under these circumstances, business confidence disappeared, and 
international investment quickly evaporated as currencies struggled to 
find their real international value (Abott, 1979). The desire in Europe 
for some form of fixed rates was apparent, but there was no agreement 
as to how this should be achieved. 
It was only after the Smithsonian Agreement of December 18, 1971, 
that a renewed thrust was imparted to the movement toward EMU. The 
Smithsonian Agreement tried to introduce a minimum order and stability 
in the foreign exchange markets through a general realignment of 
currencies. The Deutschemark was revalued by 4.6 percent. The Belgian 
franc and the Dutch guilder were revalued by 2.8 percent, no change for 
the French franc and the British pound, while Italian lira was devalued 
by 1 percent. Among other major currencies, the U.S. dollar was 
devalued by 7.9 percent, the Japanese yen revalued by 7.7 percent vis-
a-vis gold. At the same time, the margins of exchange rate fluctuation 
were tripled from .75 to 2.25 percent. This meant that the cross rate 
of any two EEC currencies could move by as much as 9 percent if they 
switched positions in relation to the dollar. As Thygesen (1979a) put 
it: 
Fluctuations of this magnitude were thought to be incompatible 
with the proper functioning of intra-trade and with the aim 
not to encourage the use by European firms of the dollar as 
a unit of account and store of value--the value of the dollar 
would in fact have become more predictable than other EC 
currencies. In self-defense a Community exchange rate 
system--the snake--was set up in March, 1972, by an Agreement 
among the central banks of the original six EC m~mbers and 
the three applicant countries (p. 315). 
In April, 1972, the European snake was formally launched. Its 
main goal was to reduce the maximum permissible fluctuation between 
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any two participating countries from 9 to 4.5 percent, thereby removing 
the asymmetry vis-a-vis the dollar. This narrower EEC band within the 
wider dollar band caused the EEC system of exchange rates to be called 
"the snake in the tunnel." Denmark, Great Britian, and Ireland, the 
prospective members of the Common Market, also joined the snake. To 
maintain the EEC currencies within the narrower band, the central banks 
agreed to intervene with EEC-currencies whenever a member currency was 
at its lower or upper limit. 
In June, 1972, a confidence crisis hit sterling which resulted in 
massive outflow of capital from United Kingdom and triggered the 
British withdrawal from the snake .. Ireland and Denmark followed suit 
thereafter. At the beginning of 1973, there was a new monetary crisis 
which triggered the Italian withdrawal from the snake and a dollar 
devaluation of 10 percent. 
Because of a lack of agreement among the nine members concerning 
a common solution, six member countries--Germany, France, Denmark, and 
the Benelax group--decided to float their currencies in con~on in March, 
1973. (Denmark, Great Bd.tian, and IreJancl formally joined the Common 
Market in January, 1973.) Thus, ~iile exchange rates between the 
participating members would be held within narrow limits, no limits 
would apply between each of them and the dollar. With the·"tunnel" 
abolished, the EC exchange rate agreement became known as the "snake 
in the lake" (Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, 
1979). 
To support the joint float (the snake without the tunnel) the 
proposed European Monetary Cooperation Fund was established in April, 
1973. Its functions were limited to facilitating coordination between 
central bank, multilateralization (the transformation of bilateral 
credits and debts into credits and debts with the Fund) of the debt 
settlements, administration of the systems of short-term monetary 
support and the use of European unit of account as the basis for all 
accounts between national central banks and the Fund. (Before April, 
1973, the mechanism of short-term monetary support was administered 
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by central banks.) The long-term role of the Fund was, however, more 
ambitious. It would evolve into a European federal reserve system 
which would be able to pull together member countries' foreign exchange 
reserves and create its own credit facilities. 
The joint float introduced in March, 1973, was viewed in the EC 
countries as a major step toward E}ill; but it generally contained seeds 
of trouble (Kreinin, 1975). For although the dollar was generally weak, 
it was weaker against the mark than against other EEC currencies. And 
there was not, on the Community level, any arrangement to deal with 
this situation. 'Given the German aversion to inflation, this could 
easily result in internal imbalances between members of the floating 
group, necessitating adjustment in the internal exchange rate or even 
the abandonment of the joint float. Indeed, the German mark was 
revalued by 5.5 percent in June and the Dutch guilder was revalued by 
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5 percent in September. In January, 197.4, France, under a strong 
speculation against the franc, decided to let the franc temporarily 
float and thus withdrew from the European snake. (France also abolished 
its two-tier exchange market in March, 1974.) 
The first stage of EJ:.ID was ended in December, 1973, without 
achieving substantial progress toward stabilizing EEC exchange rates, 
and very little progress in the field of monetary cooperation. Indeed, 
the European Honetary Cooperation Fund, as Tsoukalis (1977, p. 151) put 
it, " .•• was not much more than a plate on a door in Luxembourg." 
In January, 1974, the French franc fell out of the snake, was 
brought back into it in July, 1975, but again left it for good in March, 
1976. During 1975 there were no major steps taken toward EMU. However, 
suggestions were made to facilitate the achievement of E:t·ID. The 
Fourcade Plan--submitted in September, 1974, with no success and resub-
mitted in May, 1975, again with little positive response--proposed a 
concerted float of all EEC currencies, 2 joint dollar policy, extension 
of Community credit facilities, and the use of a new European Unit of 
Account as a pivot in the Community exchange system. 
The Marjolin Report submitted in March, 1975, emphasized the 
necessity of European Union for EEC members and stressed the measures 
to be taken on urgent problems, without elaborating a complete plan of 
EMU. Its diagnosis was striking: "In 1975, the Community was no nearer 
to EMU than in 1969. In fact, if there had been any movement, it was a 
backward movement'·' (Maillet, 1976, p. 78). In the monetary field, the 
Group proposed: (a) coordination among member countries of their 
intra- and extra-European monetary policies; (b) creation of an exchange 
stabilization fund; and (c) introduction of a new unit of account 
defined in terms of a basket of EEC currencies similar to the method 
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used in the construction of the Special Drawing Right (SDR) by the IMF. 
(The Group did not advocate the creation of a new organ, if European 
Monetary Cooperation Fund could be revised to stabilize exchange rate 
movements.) 
In Section IV the Group proposed the steps that should be taken 
toward EMU, namely, suggestions on industrial policy, energy policy, 
policy concerning capital markets, the Community budgetary policy, and 
more important, the creation of a Community Unemployment Fund. 
Another important proposal in 1975 was made by a group of prominent 
economists--The All Saints' Day Manifesto for European Monetary Union 
(The Economist, November 1, 1975). Very briefly, the Manifesto 
proposed the introduction of an attractive European Parallel Currency 
(EPC) in member countries, which would quickly drive national currencies 
out of circulation. 
Another major proposal was made in July, 1976, by Duisenberg in 
which he presented certain proposals concerning the coordination of 
economic policy and the management of exchange rates. (The Duisenberg 
proposal is discussed in Oort, 1979.) Duisenberg proposed the estab-
lishment of a "target zone" for exchange rates among EEC countries 
(individual floating countries as well as a group of countries such as 
the snake). The target zone should reflect the country's assessment 
of future exchange-rate developments as determined by, among other 
factors, the policies the country intended to follow, and the target 
zone should be defined in terms of effective exchange rates. According 
to the proposal, member countries would accept an obligation not to 
undertake policies designed to push their rate out of the zone; 
however, once tl1e effective rate was out of the zone, there was no 
obligation for the member country to adjust its effective rate, but 
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only enter into consultation with its partners as well as the Commission 
of the EC. This lack of obligation to maintain effective rates within 
the target zone is the basic difference fro~ the snake system. 
None of the above proposals received a warm welcome by EC govern-
ments. There was little disposition on the part of the individual 
countries to modify national policie3, or even at times to forego purely 
political advantage in the interests of wider Community objectives. 
Many thought that the disintegration of the snake, the drastic deteriora-
tion in terms of trade following the jump in oil prices of 1973-74, and 
the subsequent stagflation in most EEC countries had dealt a fatal blow 
to the prospects of achieving EMU. 
However, given the basic motivation of member governments to 
European unification, the subject of European Monetary Union again 
made headlines in 1977. The revival of interest was fostered by 
Jenkins (1978), president of EEC Commission, in a speech in Florence, 
Italy, in October, 1977. He suggested that the European Community 
could help itself through troubled times by reviving the idea of 
Economic and Monetary Union. The president of the EEC Commission 
called for a fresh approach to the problem of EMU. In contrast to 
the gradual approach advocated by the Werner Plan, he suggested that 
there should be a great leap toward integration. "We have to look 
before we leap, and know when we are to land. But leap we eventually 
must" (Jenkins, 1978, p. 14). 
The leap came on December 5, 1978, when it looked as though the 
European Community was about to split. After nearly 30 hours of 
debate among the nine heads of government at the Brussels summit, six 
countries agreed to join the new Eurupean Monetary System (EMS). 
Britian, Italy, and Ireland first stayed on the sidelines, but within 
35 
a week Italy and Ireland changed their minds and agreed to join EMS. 
The French-German initiative (EMS), an ambitious scheme, contains three 
parts: an exchange rate system, the creation of a European currency 
(ECU), and the first steps toward a European Monetary Fund. (A more 
detailed discussion of the EMS will be given in Chapter VI.) Each 
country's official rate is defined vis-a-vis the ECU, and since the 
ECU itself is defined as a weighted average of member currencies, it 
is impossible for any one currency to revalue upward--or downward--in 
terms of this average without a compensatory depreciation--or apprecia-
tion--of all the other participating currencies. Any adjustment of 
mutually agreed on exchange rates can thus be effected only by mutual 
consent (Triffin, 1980). 
The first adjustments were made in September, 1979, when the 
German mark was revalued 5 percent against the Danish krone and 2 percent 
against each of the other six participating currencies, with no change 
in the bilateral rates between the latter. These adjustments implied 
an upvaluation of the German mark by 1.01 percent, a devaluation of the 
Danish krone by 3.8 percent, and a uniform .97 percent devaluation of 
the other six currencies vis-a-vis the ECU. 
Despite the success of the El-fS in its early period, the system's 
more abmitious second stage--in which the use of the ECU as a reserve 
asset (instead just a unit of account for the purpose of central banks 
bookkeeping) is recommended--seems more difficult to implement as a 
result of Mittrand's election in France. The new French president 
proposes, for example, to reduce imports by reinforcing trade restric-
tions against Japan. That could ultimately disrupt relations with 
France's other traditional trading partners and jeopardize its commitment 
to European Economic and Monetary Union. 
Summary 
The major goal of abolishing all tariffs and other trade 
restrictions among member states, which was programmed in detail in 
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the Rome Treaty, was successfully completed by 1968. Also, over the 
decade of the 1960s, the Common Agricultural Policy emerged as the 
"force motrice" of the European unification. The monetary crisis of 
1968-69 gave the kickoff to discussion on definition and implementation 
of an Economic and Monetary Union. By 1970 a plan was ready--the 
Werner Report--which contained three parts: (a) reasons why new 
efforts are needed; (b) description of the ultimate goal; and 
(c) implementation of the plan by stages over 10 years, with specific 
measures to be taken on the first stage. 
The Werner strategy was based on fixed exchange rates and the 
coordination of economic policies. It failed because of the demise 
of the Bretton Woods system, and because of the changing structures 
of the international monetary system (with challenges from Japan, 
OPEC, Korea, etc., to be added to the "dollars baladeurs"). Rising 
inflation and unemployment, coupled with stagnant economic growth and 
rising international tension did not push the nine deeper into each 
others' arms in the hope of forging joint solutions to their many 
economic difficulties. They chose insteall to mark time, to look for 
national remedies, i.e., using the exchange rate as an instrument for 
balance of payments adjustment, which might rebound against them. 
ENDNOTE 
1until 1970, 45 percent of EAGG financing was derived from levies 
collected on agricultural imports and the remainder from direct 
budgetary allocations from the member governments. Since that year, 
the EAGGF has comprised of agricultural import levies, customs duties, 
sugar levies, and an appropriate part of the Value Added Tax (VAT) 
collected by member governments. However, until 1978 this last source 
of revenue has not been forthcoming, and therefore, the share of 
"own resources" to cover total expenditures was only 66.9 percent, 
with the remainder to be covered by GNP-based contributions from the 
member governments. 
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CHAPTER III 
POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Optimum Currency Area 
To study the feasibility of the monetary union in Europe, econo-
mists developed the theory of optimum currency areas during the 1960s. 
They attempted to find economic conditions for a group of countries, 
like the European Community, among which it may be optimal to adopt a 
corrunon currency. 
For Mundell (1961), a currency area should be formed if there is 
a high degree of labor mobility within that area. McKinnon (1963) 
considered that a currency a~ea should he formed by highly open 
economies, i.e., relatively high ratio of tradeable to non-tradeable 
goods. Kenen (1969) argued that countries with a high degree of 
product diversification are better candidates for forming a currency 
area. Ingram (1959; 1973), Scitovsky (1969), Whitman (1967), and 
Magnifico (1973) have suggested a high degree of financial integration, 
therefore a high degree of capital mobility among several countries as 
a criterion for optimum currency area. For Haberler (1970) and Fleming 
(1971) the similarity of inflation rates is the necessary condition to 
form a currency area. Tower and Willett (1970) emphasized that high 
degree of policy cooredination among nations is the relevant criterion 
for a group of countries to form a currency area. Vaubel (1976) agrue<l 
that the need for real exchange-rate variabilities must be regarded as 
the criterion of whether a given group of countries should adopt a 
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common currency or not; nations with large real exchange rate changes 
under flexible exchange rates would better refrain from currency 
unification. (For surveys of optimum currency areas, see Ishiyama 
(1975), Salin (1974), and Tower and Willett (1976).) 
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In all the above analyses attempts have been made to pinpoint 
economic conditions under which a group of countries may introduce a 
common currency among themselves such that the costs for individual 
country is zero (optimal for that country); little attention had been 
given to potential benefits of a common currency. The approach to 
European Monetary Union taken in this research is different from that 
of the optimum currency areas; we do not treat the question of monetary 
union as an optimality problem, but as a cost-benefit question. 
Assuming--based on a very long history of European desire to unify 
Europe--that an economic union has to be formed, we will ask what 
would be the potential costs and benefits of using a "monetarist" 
strategy, namely, a quick introduction of monetary union to enhance 
development toward full economic union. Our objective, therefore, is 
to enumerate the potential benefits and costs resulting from intro-
ducing a monetary union in Europe. The introduction of monetary union 
is facilitated if its cost, relative to its benefit, is negligible. 
Meaning of Monetary Union 
Before analyzing costs and benefits of the monetary union, it is 
appropriate to start with its definition. Monetary union is the final 
stage of a process of monetary integration. The main characteristics 
of monetary union would be a total and irrevocable fixity of exchange 
rate with zero rnargins of fluctuation, or establishment of a single 
currency. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a 
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complete union; it should also imply centralized monetary policy, a 
common external monetary policy, an integrated capital market, and 
adoption of regional policies on a Community level. However, in the 
interim period of the process of monetary integration, the various 
member countries could have their own central banks, and hence determine 
their own money supply or credit policies. Also in this interim period, 
the participants could choose a strategy of gradual elimination of 
margins of fluctuation in the hope of reaching a zero margin in the 
end-stage of the process of integration. 
Benefits of Monetary Integration 
Economic Union 
The main argument in favor of monetary union is that, since it 
increases the degree of economic integration, it thereby improves the 
allocation of economic resources as markets are enlarged. Smith (1937) 
had long ago stated that the key to increased productivity was speciali-
zation, which in turn was limited by the extent of the market, and 
therefore, an increase in the market size would contribute to the rise 
in productivity. The market-size hypothesis, which states that with 
given natural resources and capital a higher level of manufacturing 
.productivity can be attained in a wider market, could not be rejected 
by findings of an OECD study com1iaring 1+4 American and British 
industries (Paige and Bambach, 1959). Evidence supplied by OECD and 
some other studies suggest, as Balassa (1961) concluded, that: 
under ceteris paribus aE;c.umptions, a wider market will 
make possible the attainment of higher levels of manu-
facturing productivity. As for the case of economic 
integration, this proposition implies that a fusion of 
national markets would improve the growth prospects of 
the participating countries (p. 116). 
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To summarize, the argument goes like this: A large market wouldmake 
possible economies of scale in mass production and distribution, 
resulting in increased productivity and lower costs; large-scale 
producers would have easier access to sources of capital and bigger 
research and development budgets which would stimulate technical 
improvement and modernization. One of the main reasons that Europeans 
viewed a Common Market as an economic necessity was that the scale of 
technology had begun to outstrip the scale of the European nation-state 
to an extent that could not be ignored. The predominance of IBM and 
the weakness of European manufacturers of computers was an example of 
a need for a wider market. Therefore, monetary union in seen to 
enhance economic integration which in turn improves allocation of 
resources and economic efficiency so that individual welfare should 
increase in member countries. As Boyer de la Giroday- (1974) has stated: 
The treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
derives essentially from the realization that the countries 
of Western Europe are no longer large enough for the 
economic welfare of population. The treaty seeks to go 
beyond the nation-state as the fundamental unit of 
production and trade (p. 9). 
For liberal classical economists economic integration meant that 
individuals of member countries are free to enter into transactions 
with whoever offers the most acceptable terms, buyers may buy in the 
cheapest market, sellers may sell in the dearest market, workers may 
seek employment where rewards are most attractive, capital may flow 
to where expected returns are highest, etc. In the context of European 
union, economic integration is more encompassing than the liberal 
classical definition. In the discussion of EHU, although there is not 
a concensus of opinion regarding the meaning of economic integration, 
most observers, however, agree on the need for centralized decision 
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making on some economic objectives like full employment, price stability 
and growth, in addition to elimination of all kinds of trade barriers 
including exchange rates fluctuations. Since this research emphasizes 
the monetary arm of EMU, we will not spend more time on its economic 
arm which is in itself a more comprehensive area of research. 
Common Currency 
To see the benefits of a common currency among EC countries, the 
functions of money (medium of exchange, unit of account, store of value) 
will be discussed both under a flexible exchange rate and a monetary 
union among member countries. 
The usefulness of money as a medium of exchange increases with the 
size of its transaction domain. Exchange rate flexibility increases 
transaction costs (i.e., brokers fees) and the time a~d trouble needed 
to convert one national money into another (i.e., currency conversion). 
Hence, on the basis of the usefulness of money as a medium of exchange, 
Tower and Willet (1976) argue, the world is the optimum currency area. 
The most important function of money as a unit of account in 
international economics is to calculate comparative advantage for more 
than single transactions at the current instant in time. Advocacy of 
flexible exchange rates implies abandonment of the use of money as a 
·unit of account for calculating comparative advantage (Kindleberger, 
1972). Although the forward market may provide convenience to remove 
the exchange risk from particular transactions for fixed amounts, it 
has almost no relevance for removing risk from streams of expenditure 
and sales. Fur these, a single money is needed. 
The third function of money is as a store of value which makes 
possible differerit time profiles in sales and purchases. Advocates of 
flexible exchange rates, by assuming a large pool of stabilizing 
speculation with excellent prevision of the future, solve the problem 
of providing international money as a store of value. However, as we 
will discuss later, the empirical evidence on stabilizing speculation 
is mixed, and most observers agree that flexible rates tend to be 
unstable in the common sense meaning of moving up and down a lot from 
day to day, month to month, and year to year. A common currency for 
several countries would be a better store of value, because such a 
currency can command a wide selection of commodities that are free 
from price changes due to exchange rate changes. 
In summary, there is nothing that flexible rates can do, 
regarding functions of money, that a common currency cannot do better. 
Economy of Foreign Exchange Reserves 
43 
It is very likely that participants in a monetary union as a whole 
will need less international reserves than the sum of members' reserves 
(Salant, 1973). This is so because of the expansion of intra-
community official borrowing facilities and improved adjustment through 
the operation of market forces on trade and private capital flows, 
including accommodating short-term flows. On the same ground, Mundell 
(1973) and Laffer (1973) point out to the possibility of a reduced need 
·for international reserves in the process of European Monetary 
Unification. Their argument is based on the idea of spreading economic 
fluctuation over space and time. Mundell (1973) argues that the gains 
from a common currency system arise from opportunity it allows a 
country to redistribute the burden of random fluctuations through time. 
Laffer (1973) argues that the need for international reserves will 
decrease because external shocks tend to cancel each other out in 
accordance with the law of large numbers. 
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Preservation of Common Agricultural Poli..£Y_ 
Many have suggested that a flexible exchange rate regime would have 
harmful effects on the functioning of the CAP, and since the CAP is seen 
as a kind of "force motrice'1 in the process of European integration, 
therefore they advocate monetary union for the survival ·of the CAP and 
the continuing drive toward European integration. 
However, not all economists agree on the necessity of fixed rates 
to preserve CAP, as Johnson (197lb) argues: 
The chief European objection to this system (floating rate 
system) stems from the common agricultural policy. The 
argument is that changes in exchange rates among members 
confer a competitive advantage or impose a competitive 
disadvantage on one nation's farmers in competition with 
the farmers of other nations. This argument, however, 
is fallacious. If inflation is proceeding more rapidly 
in one member than in another, its farmers are being 
put at a steadily increasing competitive disadvantage by 
rising costs in conjunction with fixed product prices 
(p. 41). 
Also, Salin (1974) argues that flexibile rates facilitate the 
objectives of the CAP. This is because, under flexible rates, price 
adjustment would be very gradual and insensible. However, the writer 
believes that the above objections are not sound, since in a monetary 
union we would expect that the inflation rates of member countries be 
approximately the same and that there is no room for sizable exchange 
rates adjustments which Salin (1974) argues are more harmful for the 
CAP. 
Strengthening the International Monetary System 
Van Ypersele (1979a) argues that a flexible exchange rate regime 
upsets international trade and business investment; on the other hand, 
the political reality of today 1 s world would not permit a world-wide 
parity system such as we knew in the days of Bretton Woods. He, 
therefore, advocates a sort of international monetary reform with two 
aspects. The first aspect will be to create large stable monetary 
zones throughout the world, within which more stable exchange rates 
can be maintained. Basically, three main zones are envisaged: 
a European zone, a yen zone, and a dollar zone. The second aspect 
envisages a reduction in exchange rate fluctuations between these 
three zones. 
Countering Inflation 
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Advocates of monetary union argue that such a union will certainly 
lead to a common rate of price movement. Some even go further to argue 
that monetary union could help to break the present chronic 
inflarionary disorder (Jenkins, 1978). 
The argument that monetary union could help to country the chronic 
inflationary disroder stems from the debate over influation under 
fixed and flexible rates. There are two main arguments suggesting 
that flexible rates have an inflationary bias compared with fixed rates 
(Crockett and Goldstein, 1976). The first major argument is based 
on the asymetrical or the so-called ratchet effects of changes in 
exchange rates. This inflationary bias arises because flexible rates 
imply more frequent exchange rate changes than do fixed rates, and 
since nominal prices in goods markets are inflexible do~n1ward, depre-
ciations lead to domestic price increases in depreciating countries that 
are greater than the corresponding price declines in revaluing countries. 
(This argument is attributed to Laffer and Mundell by Wanniski (1974).) 
Crockett and Goldstein (1976) in a discussion of the empirical evidence 
on this point, concluded that, all things considered, the empirical 
evidence for the existence of ratchet effects js not particularly 
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compelling. Nevertheless, if these ratchets do exist--·and the empirical 
evidence certainly does not preclude this possibility--the net price 
effect would seem to point to some inflationary bias for flexible 
exchange rates. 
The second argument in which the exchange rate regime may affect 
inflation is usually referred to as the "discipline argument" and, as 
Crockett and Goldstein (1976) point out, even ardent supporters of 
flexible rates such as Sohmen (1963), Haberler (1964), and Yeager (1968) 
view this as perhaps the potent objection to a system of flexible rates. 
The discipline argument is that under fixed exchange rates, the 
high-inflation country will, ceteris paribus, suffer a deterioration 
in its balance of payments and a loss of international reserves. And 
a persistent deficit will ultimately lead the high-inflation country 
to discipline itself by restraining aggregate demand so as to bring 
its inflation rate into line with that of its trading partners. 
Under flexible rates, the immediate consequence for a high-inflation 
country would be a depreciation of its currency and a higher level of 
its nominal price; hence flexible rates will remove the balance of 
payments constraint in both surplus and deficit countries. 
According to Crockett and Goldstein (1976) the validity of the 
discipline hypothesis rests essentially on two propositions: (a) that 
a fixed exchange rate regime will reduce the dispersion of inflation 
rates across countries, and (b) that such dispersion is narrowed more 
by reducing the ii1f lation rate of high-inflation countries than by 
increasing the rate of low-inflation countries. After reviewing the 
empirical evidences on these propositions, Crockett and Goldstein 
(1976) concluded that ernpiric..::il evic12nces do show an increase in the 
dispersion of inflation rates across countries since generalized 
4 l 
floating, and that the nature of adjustment under Bretton Wood did place 
a greater adjustment burden (discipline) on deficit that on surplus 
countries. Major countries that have been led to adopt restrictive 
domestic policies for balance of payments reasons under Bretton Wood 
are United Kingdom (1954-55, 1957, 1960-61, 1965-66), Italy (1963-64), 
Japan (1956-57, 1963-64, 1966-67), and France (1956-57). 
Although the empirical evidence on the inflationary bias of 
flexible exchange rates is not compelling, we believe with Crockett 
and Goldstein that there does appear to be a case--resting more on a 
priori plausibility and past experience than on strong empirical 
evidence--for supposing that flexible exchange rates make it easier 
for inflationary pressures to arise and to be accommodated than do 
fixed rates. 
Vicious and Virtuous Circles Hypothesis 
Advocates of monetary integration are disenchanted with the adjust-
ment process of floating exchange rates in Europe, particularly in 
United Kingdom and Italy on the one hand, and Germany (and Switzerland) 
on the other. It is argued, not only that flexible rates do not help 
the adjustment process in Europe but also they encourage a process of 
vicious and virtuous circles which exacerbate the discrepancies in 
inflation rates among European Cmmnunity member countries and therefore 
block and set back progress towards European monetary and economic 
integration. (Di·scussion of vicious and virtuous circle hypothesis can 
be found in Lanfalussy (1979), Basevi and De Grauwe (1979), and 
Bilson (1979).) Briefly, the argument can be stated as follows: In 
high-inflation countries a decline in the exchange rate results, even 
before the slightest impact is felt on export volume, in an immediate 
rise in the cost of essential imports such as energy and raw materials 
and thus aggrevates the internal inflation rate. This in turn may 
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result in further depreciation of the exchange rate. These two phenomena 
follow and reinforce each other, setting in motion a cumulative process 
leading to a vertiable vicious circle. Conversely, in low-inflation 
countries an opposite "circle" takes place. 
Many economists in Europe reasoning on the vicious circle line 
therefore advocate a renewed attempt at monetary integration in Europe. 
On the other hand, the critics argue that, although floating rates have 
not worked perfectly in Europe, the opposite thesis, namely, that fixed 
rates did not demonstrate a better environment for appropriate adjust-
ment process. 
Exchange Rate In~tability and Its Costs 
It is argued that exchange rate instability not only encourages 
the process of economic disintegration but also has detrimental effects 
on foreign trade and investment in Europe. 
The debate over destabilizing speculation is an old one among 
economists. Nurkse (1944) argued that such an outcome was likely; on 
the other hand, Friedman (1953) has a theoretical argument that specu-
lation must be stabilizing. With the advent of generalized floating 
·in the 1970s, there is a renewal of interest in the subject in the 
literature. However, as a result of the controversy over theoretical 
arguments, the question seems at bottom an empirical one. And as 
Artus and Young (1979) point out, a good deal of evidence indicates, 
after six years of flexible rates, tlnt such a system tends to be 
unstable in the common ~.;ense J'Jeaning of moving up and Ciown a lot from 
day to day, month to month, and year to year. Moreover, as 
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Dornbusch (1976), Kouri (1976), Keran and Zeldes (1980), Bilson (1979) 
and others argue, the fact that asset markets move faster than goods 
markets, the immediate response of the exchange rate to a monetary 
policy change over-shoots the new long-run equilibrium rate. 
Moreover, Van Ypersele (l 979a) argues that the downward overshooting 
has led to inflationary pressures via increased import prices and wage 
indexation in some countries in Europe. These countries are afraid to 
allow their economy to grow faster, lest this expansion increase 
pressures on balance of payments, and cause a further currency depre-
ciation. On the other hand, the upward overshooting will necessarily 
involve deflationary effects through decreased competitivity. Therefore, 
it is argued that the overshooting element in the vicious circle 
hypothesis has a deflationary impact on the whole in the EC members. 
~~1ile most economists today agree that exchange rates are volatile 
in the common sense of the term, there is a controversy over the impact 
of such a volatility on the international trade and investment. 
On the one side of this controversy are economists like Burtle 
and Mooney (1978) who, combining information on costs with direct survey 
of American businessmen, conclude that: 
. • . We come to the tentative conclusion that while the cost 
of doing business internationally has increased, this increase 
has not led to any serious cutback in the international 
operations of U.S. companies (p. 157). 
The above tentative conclusion is also supported by econometric 
studies of Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) and Carse, Williamson, and 
Wood (1980). 
On the other side, economists like Van Ypersele (1979a) and 
Heller (1980) argue that exchange rate instability has an adverse 
impact on foreign trade and investment. It is argued that exchange 
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rate instability increases uncertainty in international transactions, 
therefore discouraging both foreign trade and international investment. 
The additional uncertainty associated with foreign trade could be 
related to the exchange rate risk and in the case of an importer, also 
to a price risk. While it may be possible to hedge against exchange 
risk, forward currency transactions cannot simultaneously protect the 
importer from both the exchange risk and the price risk (Chacholiades, 
1978). Moreover, there are numerous situations where hedging becomes 
very difficult, if not impossible. Long-term commitments of capital 
through foreign direct investment would be an example. In this case, 
a stream of earnings dominated in a foreign currency might be antici-
pated, and even if hedging were possible, it would be prohibitively 
expensive. In summary, advocates of monetary integration conclude that 
exchange rate uncertainty tends to have an adverse impact on foreign 
trade and investment. It also reinforces protectionist pressures in 
Europe as is argued by Van Ypersele (1979a). 
• . . One can safely say that exchange rate fluctuations 
have managed to replace partly the old customs barriers in 
their negative effects on growth and the developing of a 
large European market and enterprises with such dimension. 
The dismantling of customs barriers and the progress towards 
integration was one of the elements of faster growth in 
Europe in the 1960s. The instability and uncertainty as 
to the exchange rate movements between Europe on currencies 
the last few years was felt to act as a brake on integration 
and growth (p. 11). 
The above tentative conclusion of an adverse impact on trade is 
also supported by empirical studies. Masera (1976) in an econometric 
study finds an overall adverse impact of exchange rate movements on 
the· volume of world trade during 1973. Abrams (1980) by using a single-
equation econometric model, found that exchange rate uncertainty did 
have an adverse effect on international trade flows in the 1973-76 
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period. In a survey of U.K. entrepreneurs, Oppenheimer (1978) points 
out that U.K. businessmen seem to react more negatively than their U.S. 
counterparts to exchange rate instability. The Industrial Federations 
of the EC members, representing various business sectors in individual 
countries, came out unanimously in favor of a return to fixed parities 
and argued that only with the achievement of an EMU would fixed 
exchange rates be guaranteed once and for all (Tsoukalis, 1977). 
Despite the absence of a strong evidence, the writer tends to con-
clud, on a priori basis, that trade has been inhibited by exchange rate 
fluctuations which also reinforced protectionist pressures in Europe, 
therefore halting the process of economic integration. Because of these 
adverse impacts of exchange rate fluctuations on economic integration 
in Europe, one s.hould not be surprised at what has happened: The 
creation of European Monetary System in December, 1978. 
Political Union 
Because of the massive destruction during WWII, the European 
nations have shown, since 1945, a strong desire to avoid any future 
hostilities and have thus opted for much greater degree of integration. 
Therefore, monetary integration should not be interpreted narrowly as 
a relapse into the doomed world of pre-Smithsonian fixed exchange rates; 
rather, as Emerson (1979) argues, it should be interpreted as a stra-
tegic catalyst in the community's economic and political integration. 
The community has explicitly vowed to transform itself into a 
political entity. The strategy, therefore, is to induce member states 
into political entity. The process of monetary integration would lead 
in the course of time to a f;ingle European curreHcy, a European central 
bank, and a European monetary policy--that is to some of the crucial 
elements of political union. Some economists are very categorical on 
the above argument and say that "L'Europe se fcra par la monnaie ou 
ne se fera pas." 
Costs of Monetary Integration 
Large-Scale Unemployment 
The main argument against monetary integration in Europe is that 
some countries, especially those with high inflation rates, will end 
up with more unemployment than they desire, and therefore it is argued 
that these countries would resist any attempt toward monetary inte-
gration. 
The above argument makes use of the Phillips curve concept. 
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Consider two countries, .A and B, each characterized by the same Phillips 
curve Pabpab (Figure 3). Country A has a preference for point a and 
B for point b on Pabpab' 
Now assume that A and B decide to form a monetary union by fixing 
their exchange rates. As A has a higher rate of inflation, it will 
develop a trade deficit with B. Exchange rates being fixed, either 
A has to deflate, therefore increasing the unemployment from Ua to Ub, 
or B has to inflate, therefore accepting a higher rate of inflation, 
or they can compromise and choose a point like Con Pabpab' In that 
case, A will have more unemployment than it desires and B will have 
more inflation than it desires; therefore, it is argued because of 
different preferences among EEC countries, the formation of a monetary 
union will not be accepted by those countries who judge they are 
bearing too great a cost. 
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Figure 3. A and B Have the Same Phillips Curve 
we can expand this analysis by considering the case where Phillips 
curves are not the same. In Figure 4, A is characterized by P P and 
a a 
B by PbPb as their respective Phillips curve. Country A prefers point 
a and B has a preference for point b before the introduction of 
monetary union. 
The inflation rate being higher in B, to maintain the balance of 
payments equilibrium between themselves, either A has to revalue its 
money or B has to devalue its. If they form a monetary union by 
fixing their exchange rate, then the inflatio:1 rates must be 
"harmonized." This, however, does not necessarily mean that they must 
be equalized. As we wiJl see in t11e next chapter, exchange rates are 
determined in the long run by both supply and demand for money. 
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Assume for simplicity that harmonization is achieved by equalizing 
the inflation rates in both countries; suppose this common rate of 
inflation is given by P . Therefore, when monetary union is formed, 
m 
both countries find themselves in a less favorable position on their 
respective Phillips curves and as a result each government perceives a 
cost associated with participating in a monetary union. For example, 
the perceived cost for B of joining a monetary union would be the 
increase of unemployment rate from Ub to Um. Although there is a 
benefit of decreasing the inflation rate from Pb to Pm' country B 
judges the cost of higher unemployment to outweigh the benefit of lower 
inflation, and if this net perceived cost to B is very large, country B 
will resist joining the monetary union. The same argument could also 
be made for country A. 
In summary, the critics of monetary union argue that abandoning 
exchange rate flexibility would force a country to use internal policies 
in order to correct an external disequilibrium; therefore, the loss of 
the exchange rate instrument would not be acceptable for some countries 
which assess such a cost very high. 
It is the purpose of this research to show, by using a model of 
the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, that exchange 
rates are mainly monetary phenomena and could not have a lasting 
·effect on real variables (unemployment) in ECC countries. If exchange 
rates are mainly monetary phenomena, then the main objection to 
monetary union would be weak. Therefore, the governments' perceptions 
of the cost of joining a monetary union should decrease. Once this 
favorable economic environment to monetary union is realized, the 
introduction of such a union will be facilitated. (For a critic of the 
monetary union, see Gorden (1972), Aliber (1972), Fleming (1971), 
Magnifico (1971), Jolu1son (1971) and Salin (1974).) 
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CHAPTER IV 
MONETARY APPROACH TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Introduction 
The so-called "monetary approach" to the theory of the balance of 
payments is an alternative to the "elasticity approach",·the "absorp-
tion approach", and various other Keynesian approaches which may be 
termed "the foreign-income multipler approach" and "the Meade-
Tinbergen-Keynesian economic policy approach''. (The meaning of these 
approaches are summarized by Johnson (1977).) The Mo~etary Approach, 
originated by Polak (1957), Polak and Boissoneault (1960), Polak and 
Argy (1971) at the International Monetary Fund and developed in the 
1960s and early 1970s by Mundell (1968) and Johnson (1972) concentrates 
less on the employment effects of devaluation and more on its monetary 
nature. According to "monetarists", stabilization policy cannot 
influence the real long-term equilibrium position; only the price 
level is influenced, when the exchange rate is fixed. 
Some Fundamental Propositions of 
the Monetary Approach 
1. The crucial balance of payments conc2µt is one that shows the 
effect of a balance of payments deficit or surplus on domestic monetary 
base. Since only transactions considered below the line are directly 
related to monet~ny base, for "monetarists" the crucial balance of 
payments consideration is the official settlements balance. In this 
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sense, the balance of payments is an essentially monetary phenomenon. 
An assumption which, often implicitly, forms the basis of the elasticity 
approach and the other subsequent approaches is that the monetary 
consequences of a disequilibrium of the balance of payments are 
completely neutralized. In the monetary approach, on the other hand, 
it is precisely a full effect of these monetary consequences on the 
money supply that is assumed. 
2. A second proposition in the monetary approach maintains that 
balance of payment disequilibrium is the result of the discrepancy in 
the domestic stock demand for and supply of money. As Kreinin and 
Officer (1978) explain, a balance-of-payments surplus, according to 
monetary approach, occurs when the demand for money exceeds the money 
stock. If the excess demand for money is not satisfied from domestic 
sources, funds will be attracted from abroad to satisfy it. A deficit 
reflects excess supply of money as a stock. When the stock of money 
exceeds the demand for money balances, people try to get rid of the 
excess supply by increasing purchases of foreign goods and services, 
by investing abroad, or by transferring short-term funds abroad to 
acquire foreign assets. In this manner an excess demand for or supply 
of money may be cleared through the markets for goods, services, or 
securities. 
3. A third proposition maintains that balance-of-payments 
disequilibria are inherently temporary and self-correcting. Any 
balance of payments disequilibrium or exchange rate movement reflects 
a disparity between actual and desired money balances and will 
automatically correct itself, provided that a stable demand for money 
existf;. 
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As Kreinin and Officer (1978) point out, the feature responsible 
for the self-correcting is that the money demand function is considered 
as a stock demand and not as a flow. A surplus--the result of an 
excess domestic demand for money--will cont~1ue only until the inf low 
of foreign funds raise the stock of money to the level necessary to 
satisfy the demand. A deficit will continue only until the outflow 
of funds reduces the money stock to the level of desired money balances. 
However, if the monetary authorities pursue a sterilization policy, 
then continuous deficit or surplus are possible. 
4. The monetary approach is concerned primarily with the long-run. 
However, as Mussa (1976) points out, if the long-run consequences take 
a decade to materialize, then monetary approach will not be very useful. 
Therefore, the advocacy of a monetary approach to the balance of 
payments necessarily involves the assertion that the longer-run 
consequences materialize within a time horizon of two or three years. 
Assumptions of the Monetary Approach 
1. The essential assumption of the monetary approach, like the 
restated quantity theory of money is that there exists a stable demand 
for money. 
2. A second implicit assumption in the ''monetarists" writing is 
the endogeneity of money supply under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
so that a country cannot pursue sterilization policies over a long 
period; and its exogeneity under flexible exchange rates. 
3. Another assumption is that the economies concerned are 
characterized by a situation of full employment. As Frenkel and 
Johnson (1976) argue: 
. . . The assumption of normally full employment reflects 
the passage of time and the accumulation of experience of 
reasonably full employment as the historical norm rather 
than the historical rarity that Keynes' theory and left-
wing Keynesian mythology made it out to be (p. 25). 
4. An efficient world market for goods, services, and securities 
is assumed. An implication of this assumption under a system of fixed 
exchange rates is that the long-run price levels and interest rates in 
all countries must move in line with one another. Under a system of 
freely floating rates, price levels could move at different rates 
between countries. However, as Kemp (1978) points out, the impact of 
these differential rates of change on individual relative prices 
between countries is offset by opposite movement in exchange rates. 
Notice that the monetary approach does not imply that the balance 
of payments deficits or surplus are the result only of monetary 
policies. Other factors--i.e., OPEC pricing decision~ trade and 
capital controls, fiscal poljcies, interest rates, level of income, 
etc.--matter to the extent that these factors have an effect either on 
the demand for or supply of money. 
The Monetary Approach to Exchange 
Rate Determination 
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According to monetary approach, the exchange rates are regarded as 
the relative prices of different national monies. They are determined 
by equilibrium conditions between demand for and supply of the stock, 
rather than flows, of different national monies. Frenkel (1976) states 
the basis of the theory in the following words: 
Being a relative price of two assets (moneys), the equili-
brium exchange rate :Ls attained when the exjsting stocks 
of the t.1.-.-0 rnonics :tre willingly held. It :Ls reasonable, 
therefore, that a theory of the determination of the 
relative price of two monies should be stated conveniently 
in terms of the supply of and demand for these moneys (p. 201). 
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The conclusions reached tinder fixed exchange rates is easily 
converted into a theory of exchange rate under freely flexible rates. 
As Mussa (1978) argues, under floating rates, the foreign component 
of money supply is fixed. Hence, if there is a change in one of the 
arguments of the money demand function or in the domestic component 
of the money supply, equilibrium cannot be achieved by changes in the 
foreign component of the money supply. Instead, the exchange rate 
adjusts to bring money demand into equilibrium with money supply. 
According to the monetary approach, the exchange rate between two 
countries is determined by a relationship between the price levels of 
the two countries, which in turn depends, in each country, on the 
relation between the desired and actual stock of national money. 
Since the demand for money is a function of real income, interest rate 
and the price level, all these variables--along with expectations--
enter into the monetary approach model of exchange rate determination. 
Policy Implications 
Assume real income in country A increases, the conventional 
prediction, all other things being held constant, is that under fixed 
exchange rates A's balance of trade deteriorates and under flexible 
rates A's exchange rate depreciates. The monetary approach's predic-
tion is diametrically opposed to the conventional prediction. 
According to the monetary approach, as real income increases, people 
would like to hold more cash balances, given money supply. This 
f' 
increased desire for cash balances is satisfied under a gixed exchange 
rate by attracting funds from abroad (balance of payments surplus) and 
by A's exchange rate appreciation under a flexible rate regime. 
Another diametrically opposed conclusion of the monetary approach 
is the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates. 
According to conventional analysis, low interest rates are associated 
with weak currencies and high interest rates with strong ones. This 
view, as Keleher (1980) points out, is correLt under conditions of 
price stability, where a decrease in the central bank's discount rate 
represented a decrease in the real cost of borrowing and therefore 
led to an expansion of domestic credit. This in turn led to flows of 
funds out of oountry, hence the positive association of low interest 
rates and weak currencies. Under the circumstances of high growth 
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rates of money as well as high rates of inflation, a different theoreti-
cal framework is appropriate. As "monetarists" point out, the funda-
mental determinant of a country's exchange rate is its growth rate of 
excess money and, hence, its own inflation rate relative to the 
analogous growth rates of excess money and inflation elsewhere. Under 
a flexible exchange rate as excess money grows faster in country A 
than in country B, the inflation rate would be higher in country A 
than in country B; this in turn will tend to lower A's currency value 
relative to B. Moreover, inflationary expectations will quickly 
dominate interest rate movements, and interest rate in country A should 
rise. Therefore, according to monetary approach, high interest rates 
are associated with weak currencies and low interest rates with strong 
currencies (the opposite of conventional view). Under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, an increase (decrease) in the domestic rate of interest 
results in a decrease (increase) in the demand for money. The stock 
equilibrium in the money market is restored through a balance of 
payBents deficit (surplus) (again the opposite of conventional view). 
Devaluation--according to the conventional view--a devaluation of 
A's currency relative to B's currency usually causes A's national 
income and employment to increase and B's national income and employ-
ment to fall. The implication is that countries should play the game 
of beggar-thy-neighbor in time of unemployment. Therefore in this 
view the use of exchange rate changes is seen as an important policy 
variable to cure unemployment. 
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According to the monetary approach to balance of payments, exchange 
rate changes are incapable of bringing a lasting effect on employment; 
according to this view a devaluation riases tradeables prices in 
devaluing country. This increase in prices is due to the hypothesis 
of an efficient world market for tra<leable goods. Higher prices of 
tradeable goods results in an increase in desired cash balances (excess 
demand for money in stock terms). The excess demand for money is 
satisfied by attracting funds from abroad, thus, a balance of payments 
surplus, other things being equal. This balance of payments surplus 
raises gradually the real value of cash balances which, in turn, results 
in a gradual buildup of excess demand for nontradeable goods. Price 
increases for these, and presumably also for wages. 1 The resulting 
balance of payments surplus continues only until the stock money-
market equilibrium is restored. Therefore, the effect of devaluation 
is strictly transitory. In the long run, devaluation has no effect 
on real economic variables: it only raises the price level. 
Implication for Monetary Union 
If exchange rates arc mainly monetary phenomenon and are 
determined mainly by che dunarids and supplies of stocks of different 
national monies, factors which appear to give support to the use of 
exchange rate changes should be considered for the most part as illusory. 
Indeed, if exchange rate cl1anges are incapable of causing an effect on 
employment other than in the short run, and knowing that the frequent 
use of exchange rate depreciation will make the short run always 
shorter, then the loss of an exchange rate instrument for a country 
would be acceptable in view of sizable benefits resulting from 
monetary union. (For benefits of monetary union, see Chapter III.) 
An implication for monetary union is the rule for coordination of 
member countries' monetary policies. Since the long run demand for 
money is a stable function of a few variables, and these variables are 
independent of the factors that influence the money supply, then the 
rule governing the coordination of national economic policies reduces 
to a rule governing the coordination of the supply of national monies. 
As we will see later in this chapter, the exchange rate is 
determined by the following equation: 
X = K* [ M/Y ][ iJ:*). ~] 
K M*/Y* .a 
l 
where X is the exchange rate, M, Y, and i are money supply, real output, 
and interest rate, respectively, and a is the interest elasticity of 
demand for money. If members of a monetary union pursue dissimilar 
monetary policies, resulting in divergent money/output ratios, then 
either the exchange rate has to be changed as indicated by the first 
bracket (and through creation of divergent inflation expectation as 
indicated by second bracket), or if member countries keep their 
exchange rates fixed, they will develop balance of payments disequilibria. 
Tl1erefore, the rule governing the coordination of national economic 
policies reduces to coordination of monetary policies between member 
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states so as to keep the members' money/output ratios constant or 
growing at the same rate. Fiscal policies do not need to be coordin-
ated. There is room for the development of independent fiscal policies 
to deal with regional problems of depression. However, independent 
fiscal policies must be such that the rule ccucerning national monetary 
policies is not violated, in other words, independently formulated 
fiscal policies would have to be financed in private markets. Since 
according to the monetary approach, the ptentjal short-run benefits 
of divergent monetary policies quickly evaoprate and monetary devia-
tions are consequently pushed into nominal adjustments of prices and 
exchange rates, therefore coordinating monetary policies does not 
involve large-scale unemployment as the critics of monetary union argue. 
The Model 
In order to test the monetary approach to exchange rates determi-
nation, we will use a variant of the Humphrey and Lawler (1978) model 
to explain movement in exchange values of EEC countries during the 
period of flexible exchange rates running from roughly 1974 through 
1979. 
The model consists of two hypothetical national economies 
represented by a set of equations containing the following variables. 
Let M be the nominal money stock (assumed exogenous) and rn the deCTand 
adjusted rate of growth of that stock, i.e., the difference between 
the respective growth rates of the nominal money supply and real money 
demand, this difference by defintion being equal to the rate of price 
inflation. Furthermore, let D be the real demand for money, i.e., the 
stock of real cash balances that the public desires to hold, Y the 
exogenous real income, and i and r, the nominal and real rates of 
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interest, respectively. Also, let X be the exchange rate (domestic 
currency price of a unit of foreign currency), P the price level, and 
E the expected future rate of price inflation. Asterisks are used to 
distinguish foreign-country variables from home-country variables, 
and the subscript w denotes the entire world economy. 
The first part of the model consists of monetary equilibrium 
equations, one for each country: 
p M 
D and P* 
H* 
D* (1) 
stating that the price level in each country equates money supply and 
demand by deflating the real value of the nominal money stock to the 
level people desire to hold. This, of course, is the quantity theory 
of money. 
National demand for money functions constitutes the second part 
of the model, written as follows: 
D KY -a i and D* (2) 
These equations express the public demand for real cash balances as the 
product of a constant K and two variables, namely, real income and 
nominal interest rate. The parameter -a is the interest elasticity of 
demand for money. For simplicity, the numerical magnitude of the 
interest elasticity parameter is assumed to be the same for both 
countries. For the same reason, the income elasticity of demand for 
money is assumed to possess a numerical value of unity. 
The third equation of the model is the purchasing power parity 
relationship: 
p XP* (3) 
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showing how national price levels are linked together via exchange rate. 
As indicated by the equation, prices in both countries are identical 
when converted into a common currency unit at the equilibrium rate of 
exchange. This assumption can be justified (and will be tested in 
the next chapter) on the ground that the marked increase in intra-
community trade and capital flows over the past 30 years has enforced 
a high degree of parallelism in national price and cost trends of the 
member countries, when measured in a common numeriare. 
The fourth group of relationships in the model are nominal 
interest rate equations, one for each country, written as follows: 
i = r + E and i* = r* + E* (4) 
They define the nominal interest rate as the sum of the real rate of 
interest and the expected future rate of inflation, the latter variable 
being the premium added to real yields to prevent their erosion by 
inflation. 
The fifth equation expresses the interest-parity condition: 
r = r* = r 
w 
(5) 
according to which the real rate of return on capital assets tends to 
be everywhere the same and independent of the currency denomination of 
the asset. This equation reflects the hypothesis of a hihgly integrated 
efficient world market. 
Completing the model are price expectations equations that describe 
how the public forms its anticipations of the future rate of inflation: 
E m M M 
D 
D and E* m* 
M* 
M* 
D* 
D* (6) 
The price expectations equations state that the expected rate of 
inflation, E, is equal to the demand-adjusted rate of monetary 
expansion m, i.e., the different between the respective growth rates 
of the nominal money supply and real money demand. 
Taken together, the foregoing relationships constitute a simple 
seven-equation model of exchange rate determination. The model is 
summarized below: 
p M and P* M* -D D* 
D Ky .-a and D* K*Y*i*-a l 
p XP* 
i r + E and i* r* + E* 
r == r* == r 
w 
E M D and E* m* M* D*· (6) and m M D M* D* 
To repeat Humphrey and Lawler (1978, p. 139): 
The foregoing equations imply two unidirectional channels of 
influence--one direct, the other indirect--running from 
money and income (both exogenous variables) to prices to the 
exchange rate. Regarding the direct channel, the model 
implies that both exogenous variables affect prices and the 
exchange rate directly through monetary equilibrium and 
purchasing power parity equations. As for the indirect 
channel, the model implies that the rates of growth of the 
exogenous variables influence prices and the exchange rate 
indirectly via price expectations component of nominal 
interest rate variable that enters the demand for money 
function. Hore specifically, the model postulates the 
followin~~ causnl chain: 
1. The demand-adjusted money stock growth rate determines 
the expected rate of inflation. 
2. Given t11e real rate of interest, the expected rate of 
inflation determines the nominal rate of interest. 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(7) 
3. The latter variable, together with the given level of 
real income, determines the demand for money. 
4. Given the demand for money, the nominal money stock 
determines the price level. 
5. Finally, the two price 1evels, foreign and domestic, 
together determine the exchange rate. 
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Substituting equations 1 and 2 into equation 3 and 'solving for the 
exchange rate, we get the following "reduced form11 expression: 
x LK*][Ii__J[Y*][i J a LK M* Y j irj (7) 
Using equations 4 through 6, equation 7 can be alternatively 
expressed as 
[K*J[H l[Y*]r r+m Ja X = K N>~J Y-JL r'~+m*_ (7') 
Equation 7 or 7' collects the determinants of the exchange rate 
into three groups, namely, relative money supply, relative real income, 
and relative nominal interest rates comprised of a fixed real rate 
component and a variable price expectations component. Of these groups, 
the first captures purely monetary influences on the exchange rate, 
while the second and third capture real and expectational influences, 
respectively. 
Regarding monetary influence, the model predicts that the home 
country's exchange rate will depreciate (appreciate), if its money 
stock grows faster (slower) relative to the foreign country. Regarding 
real influence, it predicts that the home country's exchange rate will 
depreciate (appreciate), if its real income grows slower (faster) 
relative to the foreign country. 
As for expectational influences, the model predicts that a rise 
(fall) in the expected rate of inflation in one country--as reflected 
70 
in its interest rate--relative to the other will cause the farmer's 
currency to depreciate (3ppreciate) on the foreign exchanges. 
In order to make empirical application~ equation 7 will be 
transformed into linear form by expressing the variables as logarithms. 
The resulting log-linear version of equation 7 is written as: 
lnX a 0 + a 1 (lnM - lnM*) + a 2 (lnYi: - lnY) + 
a 3 (lni - lni*) 
(8) 
where ln stands for the logarithm of the attached variable and the a's 
are coefficients to be estimated from the statistical data. As is 
implied by equation 7, the a priori expected values of the coefficients 
attached to money and income variables are unity, whereas the coeffi-
cients attached to the interest rate variables should be between zero 
and .5, consistent with previous empirical estimates of the interest 
elasticity of demand for money. 
Since quarterly data will be used in this research and the full 
effect of income and monetary variables on exchange rates take more 
than one quarter, because households must change their consumption 
habits and firms must change their production patterns, the researcher 
believes it is more appropriate to assume that the effect of income 
and monetary variahles are distributed over four quarters. In contrast, 
exchange rates adjust relatively quickly to changes in interest rates. 
Therefore, equation (8) is modified as follows: 
4 4 
lnX ao -f 1 a (lnM - lnH*) + 1 a (lnY* - lnY) + 
n==l n m;:::l m (9) 
a3 (lni - lni*) 
Equations (8) and (9) will be estimated with ordinary least square 
(OLS) using a polynomial distributed lag (PDL) for various EC countries. 
ENDNOTE 
1The impact effect for nontradeables is ambiguous; the fall in the 
relative price of nontradeables tends to create excess demand for these, 
while the fall in the real value of cash balances operates in the 
opposite direction. However, the positive effects on excess demand will 
gradually dominate as the real value of money balances are built up by 
way of the balance of payments surplus. 
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CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Introduction 
Chapter IV presented the theoretical framework for analyzing the 
monetary model of the exchange rate. In this chapter, we present the 
statistical findings of the study. Since a very important and contro-
versial assumption of the model developed in Chapter IV is the concept 
of purchasing power parity, we first test the assertion that movements 
in relative inflation and in exchange rates are correlated with one 
another (equation 3 of the model), and then estimate the model for 
various members of the community. 
Purchasing Power Parity 
The concept of Purchasing Power Parity was developed by Cassel 
(1921) who wrote: 
The purchasing power parities represent the true equilibrium 
of the exchanges, and it is of great political value to know 
those parities. It is in fact to them we have to refer 
when we wish to get an idea of the real value of currencies 
whose exchanges are subject to arbitrary and sometimes 
wild fluctuations (p. 38). 
A thorougri discussion of the concept is given by Balassa (1964), 
Officer (1976), and Katselipapaefstratiou (1979). 
Very briefly, in its absolute version, the purchasing power parity 
implies that the equilibrium value of the exchange rate between the 
currencies of any pair of countries should be equal to the ratio of the 
72 
73 
countries' price levels; in its relative version, it implies that the 
rate of change of the exchange rate should be equal to the difference 
in the rate of inflation. 
There are many ways of presenting the evidence on purchasing power 
parity relationship. Recent empirical studies have increasingly used 
regression technique as the major methodological tool. In this research 
we present the evidence on PPP by using spectral analysis as the major 
tool; as Granger (1977) points out: 
The natural measure of the extent to which two variables 
are related is the coherence function from cross-spectral 
analysis, and the size and shape of this function is 
unaffected by applying filters to the two series involved 
(p. 22). 
An Outline of Spectral Analysis 
The main purpose of spectral analysis is to examine the variability 
of a series for different frequencies. (For more detail, see Granger 
and Hatanaka (1964).) This contrasts with ordinary statistical analysis, 
which examines the variability of the entire series. Spectral analysis 
decomposes each stationary time series into a set of frequency bands. 
The object of the analysis is to measure the relative importance of 
each frequency band in terms of its contribution to the variance 
(called power) of the entire series. lfuen we plot the variance against 
frequency, we have a "power spectrum". The concept of variability, 
however, leads to the notion of covariability or correlation between 
two series. In spectral analysis, the measure of covariability 
between two series is given by the "coherency". Coherence measures the 
linear correlation between the two coDponents of the bivariate process 
at different frequency bands and is analogous to the square of the 
usual correlation coefficient. T11e greater the coherence the greater 
the correlation, two series that have a coherence of 1.0 implies that, 
at the particular frequency used, the series are not different. On 
the other hand, if the coherence coefficient is zero, the two series 
are said to be totally uncorrelated. (For a mathematical presentation 
of spectral analysis, see Appendix C.) 
The Empirical Results on PPP 
To investigate the relationship between exchange rates and 
relative prices among EC countries, we will use monthly data from 
1974.01 to 1979.12. The choice of the base year is rationalized on 
the ground that the Bretton Wood era officially ended in 1973. The 
choice of the terminal year preferably is the end of 1978 when the 
new European Monetary System came into being, however, since in spectral 
analysis a large number of observations is needed, the terminal year 
therefore is chosen to be the end of 1979, so that we have 72 obser-
vations, large enough for spectral estimations. As regard to the 
choice of the price index, the consumer price index is used in the 
rest of this chapter. Finally, bilateral exchange rates will be used 
for all the empirical studies in this chapter. The following notations 
for exchange rates and relative prices are used: 
XJK = exchange rate between country J and country K, defined as 
J's currency price of a unit of K's currency. 
PJK relative price between country J and K, defined as the 
consumer price index of country J over the consumer price 
of country K (P3 /PK). 
J and K = B, D, F, G, I, N, UK 
where B, D, F, G, I, N, UK represent Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, and United Kingdom, respectively. For example, 
XGF denotes the price of one French Franc in D-Mark (D-Mark per French 
Franc); and PGF denotes the ratio of the Germany_ consumer price France 
indices. 
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Our task is to examine the coherency of XGK with PGK (Germany being 
the home country, K B, D, F, I, N, UK) and the coherency of XFK with 
PFK (France being the home country, K = B, D, G, I, N, UK). Since the 
interpretation of the coherency can be fraught with danger unless one 
uses stationary time series, the first step therefore is to plot XGK 
and PGK against the time. This is demonstrated by Figures 5 through 
10 where time is represented on the horizontal axis (72 monthly observa-
tions from 1974-01 to 1979-12) and XGK and PGK on the vertical axis. 
The exchange rate (XGK) is scaled to equal approximately the relative 
prices (PGK). 
Figures 5 through 10 reveal that the XGK and PGK series have a 
trend thus indicating the need to detrend these serie~ before estimating 
the coherence coefficients. (The plot of XFK and PFK against the time 
also showed trends in XFK ancl PFK, t1·1erefore, indicating the need to 
detrend these series also.) One method suggested by Granger and 
Newbold (1974) and used in this research, is to build single models for 
each series, using the method of Box and Jenkins, and then searching 
for relationships between series by relating the residuals from these 
single models. The approach taken in this research, therefore, is to 
·identify and estj_mate autoregressive integrated moving average models, 
ARIMA, to the various series (XGK, PGK, XFK, PFK); and then estimate 
the coherence functions between the residuals from these single models. 
(Since an examination of the autocorrelation functions did not reveal 
strong seasonality in the series, we consider models of the general 
ARI"MA form.) 
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An Outline of the Box-Jenkins Method 
Authoregressive Integrative Moving Average (ARIMA) models had been 
studied extensively by Box and Jenkins (1970) and their names frequently 
have been used synonymously with general ARIMA processes applied to 
time series. 
The autoregressive (AR) arm of an ARIHA model can be represented 
in the form: 
W = ¢1W l + ¢2W 2 + . . . + ¢ W + e t t- t- p t-p t (1) 
where e is a series of independent and identically distributed random 
t 
variables with mean zero and constant variance, W denotes a time 
t 
series which is stationary (it could represent deviation from some 
deterministic trend). 
The general autoregressive model of order P AR(p) can take several 
forms depending upon the order P. For example, an AR(l) model can be 
written as 
and an AR(2) may be written as 
The moving average (HA) arm of an ARINA model can be represented 
in the form 
(2) 
Equation (2) is called a moving average of order q; a HA(l) model 
is 
w 
t 
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Equations (1) and (2) lead to the so-called rnixe<l autoregressive 
moving average process, 
wt - ¢lwt-1 - ... - ¢ w = e - ele 1 - ... - e e (3) p t-p t t- q t-q 
where p and q are the order of autoregressive and mov,ing average 
respectively. To manipulate models of this kind it is convenient to 
define a backward shift operator B such that 
BWt W t-1 
using the operator B, (3) can be written 
where 
..h (B)Wt 
't'p 
¢ (B) 
p 
G (B)e 
. q t 
e (B) = i - e B - e B2 -q 1 2 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
are polynomials in B of degree p and q respectively and cl> (B) is called p 
the autoregressive operator and 0 (B) the moving average operator. q 
Suppose, now, that one has a given time series Xt. If Xt is not 
stationary, it must be transformed to a stationary series by taking the 
appropriate level of differences; that is, there exists an integer d 
such that 
w 
t 
is a stationary tir::c series. Combining equations (4) and (7), the 
series Xt can be represented by the model, 
(7) 
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¢ (B)VdX = 8 (B)e p t q t (8) 
Equation (8) represents an autoregressive integrated moving average 
process of order (p, d, q), denoted as ARIHA (p, d, q). 
The choice of the appropriate p and q values requires examining 
the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients calculated 
from the sample. In general, where the autocorrelation function of an 
autoregressive process of order p tails off, its partial-autocorrelation 
function has a cut-off after lag p. Conversely, the autocorrelation 
function of a moving average process of order q has a cut-off after 
lag q, while its partial autocorrelation tails off. Furthermore, the 
th 
autocorrelation function for a mixed process, containing a p -order 
th 
autoregressive component and a q -order moving average component, is 
a mixture of exponential and damped sine waves after the first q-p lags. 
Following the Box-Jenkins method the best fitting models were 
identified and estimated after analyzing the autocorrelation and parial 
autocorrelation functions and checking that residuals were white noise. 
The results of the estimation for the complete sample period (1974-01 
through 1979-12) are reported in Table I for XGK and PGK and in Table 
II for XFK and PFK. 1 The analysis of residuals shows that the hypothesis 
of white noise cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level in all cases. 
The x2 statistic, developed by Box and Pierce (1970) provides an overall 
test on the autocorrelations of the estimated residuals. The procedure 
is to compare 
2 
x n 
where n is the sample size and m denotes the largest time lag included, 
with tabulated values of the chi-squared statistic for m-p-q degrees of 
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TABLE I 
ESTIMATES OF ARIMA MODELS FOR XGK AND PGK 
Model Parameters 2 
Series Type d ¢1 ¢2 ct> 3 81 X20 
XGB Random Walk 1 11. 7 
PGB ARMA 1 .4612 -.2778 20 .1 
(4.18) (-2.33) 
XGD Random Walk 1 9.4 
PGD Random Walk 1 22.2 
XGF AR 1 .4720 13.9 
(4.48) 
PGF AR 1 .2985 24.8 
(2.6) 
XGI AR 1 .5288 25.7 
(5.25) 
PGI AR 1 .3700 16.8 
(3. 34) 
XGN Random Walk 1 13.4 
PGN AR 1 .3035 -.4581 27.1 
(3 .00) (-4.6) 
XGUK MA 1 -.3300 15.2 
(-2.9) 
PGUK MA 1 -.3660 18 .o 
(-J·. 3) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses under each coefficient are t-statistics, 
all coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; 
d represents number of differencing in ARU1A models. If x is a 
random walk, then X - X 1 is a white noise process. 
t 
t t-
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TABLE II 
ESTIMATES OF ARIMA MODELS FOR XFK AND PFK 
Model Parameters 2 
Series Type d <h <P 3 81 82 X20 
XFB AR 1 .3197 16.4 
(2. 82) 
PFB ARMA 2 -.8862 .8330 18.5 
(-11.35) (9.22) 
XFD Random Walk 1 16.0 
PFD Random Walk 1 22.1 
XFG AR 1 .3996 13. i 
(3.85) 
PFG AR 1 .3858 28.2 
(3.50) 
XFI AR 1 .3224 9.0 
(2.86) 
PFI Random Walk 1 14.9 
XFN MA 1 -.3950 12.6 
(3.60) 
PFN ARMA 2 - . 66 77 .8282 18.6 
(-7.20) (13. 00) 
XFUK. MA 1 -.5224 16.1 
(-5.11) 
PFUK. AR 1 .3815 12.6 
(3. 45) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses under each coefficient are t-statistics, 
ail coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level; 
d represents number of differencing in ARIMA models. If Xt is a 
random walk, then X - X 1 is a white noise process. t t-
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freedom. 2 If the computed value of the X of the residuals is smaller 
2 than the value from the X table, the hypothesis that the autocorrela-
tions are not significantly different from zero is supported, indicating 
that the residuals are randomly distributed and that the model used is 
a good one. The computed values of the x2 of the residuals with 20 
degrees of freedom are given in Tables I and II in the last column, the 
2 
tabulated x value for 20 degrees of freedom is 31.4 at the 5 percent 
level, thus indicating that the models used are good, since only random 
errors remain. 
Tested Relationships Between Exchange 
Rates and Relative Prices 
We turn now our attention to the coherencies between exchange rates 
and relative prices. \fnile a great deal of studies have been conducted 
on purchasing power parity, the writer is not aware of any study which 
has used spectral analysis to compare relative price and exchange rate 
relationship among all frequencies. Using the residuals from the 
fitted ARIMA models, we estimated the coherenceis between XGK and PGK 
(K = B, D, F, I, N, UK) and also between XFK and PFK (K = B, D, G, I, 
N, UK). 2 
The coherency between XGB (DM/BF) and PGB (PG/PB) is illustrated 
in Figure 11. Figures 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 show the coherencies 
between XGD and PGD, XGF and PGF, XGI and PGI, XGN and PGN, and XGUK 
and PGUK, respectively. Note that in the frequency concept, the ideas 
of long-run, short-run, etc., may be defined specifically, e.g., long 
run= low frequencies (from 0 to 2n/30, say, when using monthly data), 
short-run= high frequencies (from n/2 to TI, say), and middle-run 
could correspond to the remaining frequencies (Granger and Hatanka, 1964). 
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Exa~ination of Figures 11 through 16 reveals that the coherence is high 
in certain frequency bands but not high in all frequency bands, thus 
indicating high relationship between exchange rates and relative prices 
at those particular frequency bands. 
The coherencies between XFB and PFB (FF/BF and the ratio of 
consumer price index BFralE_~e ), XFD and PFD, XFG and PFG, XFI and PFI, 
e gium 
XFN and PFN, XFUK and PFUK, are shown in Figures 17 through 22. Again 
from Figures 17 through 22 it is apparent that the coherencies between 
exchange rates and relative prices are high in some frequency bands 
thus indicating that only in these particular frequency bands there 
is a strong relationship between exchange rates and relative prices. 
In summary, the coherency analysis suggests that although there 
is high correlation between the exchange rate and relative price, the 
relationship is not consistent in the sense that it is high in certain 
frequency bands and low for some other frequency bands. 
The Monetary Model of the Exchange 
Rate Determination 
We turn now our attention to the monetary model of the exchange 
rate determination developed in Chapter IV. In the rest of this 
chapter we attempt to estimate the following two versions of the 
monetary model of the exchange rate determination: 
lnXJK a + b(lnMJ - lnMK) + c(lnYK - lnYJ) + 
(Model I) 
d ( lnIJ - lnIK) 
4 4 
lnXJK a + 2-: b (lnMJ - lnNK) + L: c (lnYK - lnYJ) + 
m=l m m=l m (Model II) 
d(lnIJ - lnlK) 
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0 
where the following notations are used: 
XJK = exchange rate between country J and country K, defined as 
J's currency price of a unit of K's currency, 
MJ country J's money supply, 
MK country K's money supply, 
YJ country J's real income, 
YK country K's real incorr:e, 
IJ country J's nominal interest rate, and 
IK country K's nominal interest rate. 
ln stands for the logarithm of attached variable and the a's, b's, 
e's and d's are coefficients to be estimated from the statistical 
data. (The relevant data are described at the end of this study.) 
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Note that according to the monetary model of the exchange rate determi-
nation the a priori expected values of the coefficients attached to 
the money and income variables are unity v.Thereas the coefficient 
attached to the interest rate variables shou]d lie between zero and 
.5, consistent with interest elasticity of the demand for money. 
The two versions of the monetary model, equations (I) and (II) 
were estimated for Germany/Belgium, Germany/Denmark, Germany/France, 
Germany/Italy, Germany/Netherlands, Germany/UK, France/Belgium, France/ 
Denmark, France/Germany, France/Italy, France/Netherlands, France/UK, 
UK/Belgium, UK/Denmark, UK/France, UK/Germany, UK/Italy, and UK/ 
Netherlands, for the period 19741 to 1979II. 
Germany/Belgium 
Equation (I) was estimated for quarterly Germany/Belgium data for 
the period 19741 to 197911. The money supply variable used for each 
country was the narrow def intion of money incl.uding currency and demand 
102 
deposits, Ml. Since there is no quarterly data for Belgium gross 
domestic product, the inde'Z of indust:rial production was used as a proxy 
for real income. As for the interest rate variables, the discount rate 
was used for each country, and we obtained the following: 3 
lnXGB = -2.79 - .03(lnHG - lnMB) + .08(lnYB - lnYG) + 
(-33.65)* (-.50) (.72) 
.02(1nIG - lnIB) 
(1.92)** 
.84 D.W. 2.19 p = . 94 
(12.93)* 
F(3,17) 
(99) 
30.29 
Although the R2 and F-statistic are high, thus indicating an overall 
goodness of fit, the money supply and real income coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero. The interest rate coefficient is 
significant at 10 percent level and is consistent with its hypothesized 
value. 
In order to estimate the version II of the monetary model, 
equation II, data for the period 19731 to 197911 were used and the 
following estimated coefficients were obtained: 4 
4 4 
a = -3.23 L: b = -.34 L: c = .27 d = .01 
(-56.38)* m=l m ( -8. 5 7) * m=l m (2.91)* (1.90)** 
R2 
= .95 D.W. 2.61 F(S,16) 55.24 
(99) 
The estimated coefficient for money supply variable has the wrong 
sign but the estimated coefficients for real income and interest rate 
both have the Lypothesized positive signs. 
Equation 1 was estimated for quarterly Germany/Denmark data from 
the period 19741 to 197911. The money supply variable, real income 
variable and interest rate variable used for each country were Ml, 
index of industrial production and discount rate respectively. The 
estimated equation is: 
lnXGD = -.99 - .15(lru~G - lnMD) - .05(lnYD - lnYG) + 
(-6.38)* (-1.35) (-.75) 
.02(lnIG - lnID) 
(. 4 7) 
• 96 D. W. 1.36 p = .97 
(18.81)* 
F(3,17) 
(99) 
131. 90 
The above estimated equation does not support the monetary model 
of equation 1, according to which the estimated coefficients of real 
income and money supply should be unity. Equation II was also esti-
mated and the following coefficients were found: 
4 4 
a = -1.34 L: b = .13 L: c = .19 d = .01 
(-3.82)* m=l m (.Lil) m=l m (. 42) (.28) 
R2 = 
.97 D.W. = 1. 37 p = .97 F(5,15) 93.6 
(18.91)* (99) 
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Although the estimated coefficients all have the right signs, they are 
all insignificant both at 5 and 10 percent levels. Therefore in the 
case of Germany/Denmark, it can be seen that the monetary model does 
not work well. 
Germany/France 
Equation I was estimated for quarterly Germany/France data for the 
period 1974I to 1979II. The money supply, real income and interest 
rate variable used for each country were Ml, real gross domestic 
product and discount rate respectively. The following was found: 
lnXGF = -.61 + .15(lnMG - lnMF) - .20(lnYF - lnYG) + 
(-2.57) (.46) (-1.21) 
.13(lnIG - lnIF) 
(1.66) 
R2 = .90 D. W. 1. 59 p = .96 F(3,17) 
(16. 79)* 
52.30 
(99) 
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As we can see the estimated coefficients are not significant and there-
fore the above estimated equation is not satisfactory. However a more 
satisfactory result is obtained when using version II of the monetary 
model. Below the estimated coefficients of the equation II are 
presented: 
4 4 
a = .05 l: b = 1. 81 l: c = 3.2 d = .11 
(. 06) m=l m (2.40)* m=l m (2.11)* ( 1. 62) 
R2 
= .95 D.W. = 2.08 p .95 F(5,15) = 52.90 
(14.54)* (99) 
The estimated coefficients for money supply and real income variables 
are not different from unity at 5 percerit significance level as was 
hypothesized by the monetary model. 
Germany/Italy 
Equation I was estimated for quarterly Germany/Italy data for the 
period 1974I to 1979II. The money supply, real income and interest 
rate variable used for each country were Ml, real gross domestic 
product and discount rate respectively. The following were obtained: 
lnXGI 
• 96 
-.11 + 1.19(lnMG - lnMI) + .38(lnYI - lnYG) + 
(.07) (10. 75)* (1.33) 
.lS(lnIG = lnII) 
(5.85)* 
D.W. 1. 59 F(3,18) = 129.93 
(99) 
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The money supply coefficient is not significantly different from 
unity at 5 percent level as was hypothesized. The interest rate 
coefficient is also consistent with the monetary model, however the 
real income coefficient is not significantly different from zero. 
Equation II was also estimated using data for the period 19731 to 
19791I and the following were found: 
4 4 
a = -1.64 L b = 1.31 L c .88 d = .25 
(-.45) m=l m (20.27)* m=l m (1.14) (12.68)* 
R2 
= .99 D.W. 1.98 F(S,16) 283.87 
(99) 
The money supply coefficient is even greater than unity and has 
the right sign. (This might be explained by exchange rate overshooting.) 
The interest rate coefficient is consistent with its hypothesized value, 
the real income variable although having the right sign and close to 
its hypothesized value is not significant. 
Germany/Netherlands 
Equations l and II were estimated for quarterly Germany/Netherlands 
data for the period 1974I and 1973I to 197911 respectively. The money 
supply, real income and interest rate variables used for each county 
were Ml, industrial production and discount rate respectively. The 
following was obtained for equation I: 
lnXGN = -.17 + .06(lnMG - lnMN) + .55(lnYN - lnYG) + 
(-3.34)* (1.48) (5.48)* 
.05 (lnIG - lnIN) 
(4.02)* 
R2 = .78 D.W. 1.57 F(3,18) = 21.63 
(99) 
As for the coefficients of the equation II, the following were 
found: 
a = ·-.26 
(-2.96)i~ 
R2 = .85 
4 
L: b 
m=l m 
4 
=.13 L~C 
(1. 78)** m=l m 
= • 61 
(6.3!+)* 
D.W. = 2.08 F(5,16) = 17.77 
(99) 
d = .04 
(2.51)* 
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The real income and interest rate coefficients are consistent with 
the monetary model, the money supply coefficient although having the 
right sign is far from its hypothesized value of unity. 
Germany/United Kingdom 
Equations I and II were estimated for quarterly Germany/UK 
data for the period 19741 and 19731 to 197911 respectively. The money 
supply and real income variables used were Ml and real gross domestic 
product for each country. As for the interest rate, public authorities 
bond yield was used for Germany and government bond yield for UK. The 
following was obtained for equation I: 
lnXGUK = 4. 58 + 1. 26 (lnMG - lnNUK) + . 64 (lnYUK - lnYG) + 
.94 
(2.37)* (6.41)* (2.05)** 
.46(lnIG - lnIUK) 
(4.58)* 
D.W. 1.46 F(3,18) 94.82 
(99) 
All of the estimated coefficients are consistent with their 
hypothesized values of the monetary model. Equation II was also 
estimated and the following coefficients were obtained: 
10 7 
4 4 
a = -5.84 L.: b = .98 L.: c - 2.50 d = . 53 
(-. 75) m=l m (3.11)* m=l m (1.90)** (5.44)* 
R2 
= • 96 D.W. 1.04 F(S,16) 82.85 
(99) 
The above estimates are also in conformity with the monetary model 
and support the monetary nature of the exchange rate. 
Tables III and IV report the regression results for France and 
each other EC member based upon equation forms I and II respectively. 
For version I single equation estimation (OLS) as well as Cochrane-
Orcutt iterative estimation (CORC) were used. For version II a poly-
nomial distributed lag (PDL) scheme was used. And when there is a 
first order serially correlated residuals, the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
(PDLCORC) estimation was used. 
All money supply variables used for each country were Ml. As for 
the real income variables, gross domestic product were used for France/ 
Germany and France/Italy and the industrial production index was used 
for all others. The interest rate variables used were government bond 
yield for France/Denmark and France/UK and discount rate used for all 
other cases. 
As we can see, the results of version II of the monetary model in 
Table IV are striking. The monetary effect, ~b. measures the combined 
effect of the current and lagged values of the monetary influence on 
the exchange rate. The coefficient values are statistically significant 
in all cases and all have the right signs. Moreover five of these 
coefficients ar~ not statistically different from unity as was hypo-
thesized by the monetary model prediction and the one which is 
statistically different from unity (.51) is very close to unity. 
As for the real income coefficients, L.:c, the results are not as good 
TABLE III 
ESTIMATES OF THE EQUATION I OF THE MONETARY MODEL, FRANCE BEING THE HOME COUNTRY 
Dependent Equation R2 Variable Period Type a b c d F p 
XFB 1974I to OLS -1. 70 .88 -.98 .20 .69 13.40 
l 979II (15.43))~. (4.39)* (-1.66) (2.35)* (99) 
XFD 1974I to CORC -.29 .04 -.02 .23 .59 8 .18 . 77 
197911 (-.74) (. 21) (-.20) (.29) (99) (5.53)* 
XFG 19741 to CORC .61 .15 -.20 .13 .90 52.36 .96 
1979II ( 1. 5 7) (. 46) (-1.21) ( 1. 66) (99) (16.79)~~ 
XFI 1974I to OLS -13.84 .43 2.54 .19 .94 93.58 
l 979II (-6.30)* (6.00)* (5.34)* (6.18)* (99) 
XFN 1974I to CORC .46 .13 -.32 .04 .87 38.50 .93 
1979II (1.65) ( 1. 08) (-.86) (.72) (99) (11.46)* 
XFUK 19741 to OLS 5.95 .92 .66 .43 .67 12.36 
l 979II (9.22)* (5.47)* ( 1. 4 7) (2.69)* (99) 
-
Note: Numbers in the parentheses below coefficients are t-statistics; D.W. is the Durbin-Watson 
statistic; numbers in parentheses below F-statistics are significance level; and * indicates 
significant at the 5 percent level and ** indicates significant at the 10 percent level. 
D.W. 
1.16 
1.42 
1. 59 
1. 36 
1. 72 
1.04 
,_. 
0 
(X) 
TABLE IV 
ESTIMATES OF THE EQUATION II OF THE MONETARY MODEL, FRANCE BEING THE HOME COUNTRY 
DPpe:ndent Equation 
R2 Variable Period Type a L:b LC d F p D.W. 
XFB 1973I to PDL -1.42 1.37 -.95 .15 .92 36.41 1.23 
l 979II (-11.47)* (6.97)* ( 1. 73) (3.27) (99) 
XFD 19731 to PDLCORC -3.44 1.64 1.48 .07 . 71 7.39 .93 1.41 
1979II (-2.69)* (2.59)* (2.07)** (. 98) (99) (11.55)* 
XFG 19731 to PDLCORC -.05 1. 81 3.2) . 11 .95 52.78 .95 2.09 
l 979II (-.06) (2.39)* (2.10)* (1.62) (99) (14.53)* 
XFI 19731 to PDL -12.82 . 51 2.39 .24 • 96 81.11 1. 32 
1979II (-4.65) (6.53)* (4.12)* (4.51)* (99) 
XFN 19731 to PDLCORC -.57 .57 -2.60 .03 .94 46.31 .79 2. 16 
l 979II (-.91) (l.97)** (-4.00)* (. 85) (99) (5.84) 
XFUK 19731 to PDL 5.58 .80 1.04 .47 .75 9.36 1.43 
l 979II (8.48)* (4.48)* (1. 78) 'k* (3. 04) * (99) 
Note: Numbers in the parentheses below coefficients a·re t-statistics; D. W. is the· Durbin-Watson 
statistic; numbers in parentheses below F-statistics are significance level; * indicates 
significant at the 5 percent level; and ** indicates significant at the 10 percent level. 
....... 
0 
'° 
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as in the case of money supply coefficients. Only four coefficients 
support the monetary model's prediction and the other two coefficients 
have the wrong signs. As for the interest rate coefficients, they 
generally support the monetary model's predictions. 
Tables V and VI report the regression results for the United 
Kingdom and each other EC member based upon equation forms I and II 
respectively. All money supply variables used were Ml. Real gross 
domestic product was used for UK/Germany and UK/Italy and industrial 
production index in all other cases. As for the interest rate 
variable government bond yield j_s used in all cases. 
The results of version II of the monetary model in Table VI are 
very satisfactory. In all cases the coefficients attached to money 
supply variables have the expected positive signs. Moreover, in the 
case of UK/Belgium, UK/Frane, UK/Germany, and UK/Italy, these 
coefficients are not statistically different from their expected 
(theoretical) value of unity. The coefficients on real income variables 
also have all positive signs in accordance with the monetary model of 
the exchange rate determination. In addition for UK/Denmark, UK/France, 
and UK/Germany, they are not statistically different from unity. The 
interest rate coefficients are all significant and between zero and 
.5. Thus, they are consistent with their expected values. 
Summary 
Both versions of the monetary model of the exchange rate determi-
nation developed in Chapter IV have been estimated. In general, 
version II performed much better than version I and this is not 
surprising since in version II we have not only considered the current 
effect of money supply and real income but also their lagged values 
TABLE V 
ESTIMATES OF THE EQUATION I OF THE MONETARY MODEL, UNITED KINGDOM BEING THE HOME COUNTRY 
Dependent 
Variable 
XUKB 
XUKD 
XUKF 
XUKG 
XUKI 
XUKN 
Period 
1974I to 
1979II 
1974I to 
1979II 
19741 to 
1979II 
19741 to 
l 979II 
19741 to 
1979II 
19741 to 
1979II 
Equation 
Type 
OLS 
CORC 
OLS 
OLS 
OLS 
CORC 
a 
-7. 77 
(-13.32) 
-1.37 
(-1.27) 
-5.95 
(-9.22) 
-4.57 
(-2.37)* 
-6.42 
(-14.90))'C 
-1.34 
(-2.03)*~'t 
b 
1.09 
(7.1)* 
-.16 
(-.88) 
.92 
(5.47)* 
1. 26 
(6.41)* 
.63 
(3.25))~ 
-.02 
(-.15) 
c 
-.02 
(-.04) 
.10 
(.69) 
.66 
(1.47) 
.64 
(2.05)** 
.16 
(.29) 
.09 
( • 30) 
d 
-.09 
(-. 40) 
.16 
(2.30)* 
.43 
(2.69)* 
.46 
(4.59)* 
.09 
(2.35)* 
. 21 
(2.37)* 
R2 
.85 
.92 
.67 
.94 
.67 
.96 
F 
35.30 
(99) 
70 .19 
(99) 
12.36 
(99) 
94.90 
(99) 
12.37 
(99) 
139.64 
(99) 
p 
.89 
(8.92)* 
D. W. 
1.13 
2.00 
1.04 
1.46 
1.45 
1. 71 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficients are t-statistics; D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic; 
numbers in parentheses below F-statistics are significance level; * indicates significant at· 5 
percent level; 2nd ** indicates significant at the 10 percent level. 
,_. 
,_. 
....... 
• 
TABLE VI 
ESTIMATES OF THE EQUATION II OF THE MONETARY MODEL, UNITED KINGDOM BEING THE HOME COUNTRY 
Dependent Equation 
R2 Variable P-eriod Type a L:b LC d F p D.W. 
XUKB 19731 to PDLCORC -6.98 .80 .46 .27 . 96 69.50 .84 2.18 
1979II ( -6. 2 9) )'c (2.47)* ( . 81) (2.18)* (99) (7.12)* 
XUKD 19731 to PDLCORC -5.09 .45 .99 .19 .93 40. 96 .83 2.20 
1979II (-1.71) (. 91) (2.02)** (2.42)* (99) (6.69) 
XUKF 19731 to PDL -5.58 .80 1.04 .47 .75 9.36 1.43 
197911 (-8.48)* (4.48)* (1. 78)** (3 .04) * (99) 
XUKG 19731 to PDL 5.85 .98 2.50 .53 . 96 82.85 1.04 
197911 (.75) (3.ll))'c ( 1. 90) '>'c* (5.47)* (99) 
XUKl 1973I to PDL -5.27 1.16 1.30 .08 .83 15.75 1.50 
197911 (-9.46)* (5.30)* (1. 63) (2.65)* (99) 
XUKN 19731 to PDLCORC -3.29 .29 .34 .20 . 96 72.43 .91 1.54 
l 979II (-1.33) (. 72) (. 44) (2.39)* (99) (10.08)* 
Note: Numbers in parentheses below coefficients are t-statistics; D.W. is the Durbin-Watson statistic; 
numbers in parentheses below F-statistics are significance level; * indicates significant at the 
5 percent level; and ** indicates significant at 10 percent level. 
,__, 
N 
up to one year. This is compatible with the long-run nature of the 
monetary model of exchange rate determination. 
113 
Another important point is that the model assumes that the 
exchange rates are permitted to float freely while in fact Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany and Netherlands never left the snake from 1973 to the 
creation of the EMS. (For a chronology of the snake, see Appendix B.) 
On the other hand, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom were mostly 
outside of the snake over the same period. In view of this, therefore, 
it is not surprising to find poor results for Germany/Belgium, 
Germany/Denmark, and Germany/Netherlands, who were all dedicated 
participants in the European snake. 
In sum, except for a few cases, the equations reported above 
empirically support the monetary model of exchange rate determination 
developed in Chapter IV. It is without any doubt this monetary 
nature of the exchange rate that encouraged the launching of the EMS. 
As in the more inflation-prff;le countries of the community past 
attitiudes to the role of exchange rate change as an instrument of 
economic policy had been increasingly questioned since 1976 
(Thygesen, 1979b). 
An implication of the monetary nature of the exchange rate is 
that in order for a group of countries to fix their exchange rate 
'together a necessary condition is a roughly similar monetary policy 
by all participant members. The convergence of monetary policies is 
an implicit feature of the EMS. (For more discussion of the EMS, 
see Chapter VI.) 
ENDNOTES 
1Estimations \Jere performed with the Marquardt non-linear least 
squares algorithm by using T series--A User-Oriented Computer Program 
for Identifying, Fitting, and Forecasting ARHL'°I. Time Series Models, 
developed by W. Q. Meeker, Jr., Statistical Laboratory, Iowa State 
University. 
2The . . f d b . f . . . f estimation was per orme y using a -inite Fourier trans arm 
to obtain periodograms and cross periodograms. The periodogram 
ordinates were smoothed by triangular weighting; since it is advisable 
to group the periodogram (or cross-periodogram) ordinates in set of 
size n/40 (see Appendix C), we decided to put~ weight on current 
value, ~ weight each on the values one lag preceding and following the 
current value (121). The SAS computer program was used for all 
estimation. 
3t-statistics are given in parentheses beneath the estimated 
coefficients and * indicates statistical significance at 5 percent 
level, ** indicates statistical significance at 10 percent level. 
D.W. stands for Durbin-Watson statistics, if it is less than its 
theoretical lower limit, then we use a Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
technique (CORC) in estimating the equation and present the final value 
of rho. Numbers in parenthesc~s below F-statistics are significance 
levels. 
4A polynomial distributed lag (PDL) of degree two was used, and 
since we had a priori reasons to believe that the lag structure will 
taper off to negligible value, we imposed only the far end zero 
restriction. Also, since in using a PDL technique we lose some degree 
of freedom, we therefore used data from the 1973I to 1979II. These 
specifications will also be used in all future estimations of the 
equation II of our model. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM 
Introduction 
The level of economic interpenetration between Community members 
does require as much stability as possible between their exchange rates 
if trade is to prosper; disenchantment of the floaters with the working 
of the floating rates; the diminishing faith in the Community of the 
role of exchange rate as a policy instrument; change of attitude in 
Germany with regard to the advantages of further real appreciation of 
DM; fears of instability of the dollar, as much for these reasons as 
for any desire to step again out on the road toward EMU, the Nine 
agreed during the course of 1978 on the creation of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) which came into force in Harch, 1979. 
The EMS contains three parts: an exchange rate system; the 
creation of a European currency, the ECU; and the first steps toward 
a European Monetary Fund (Van Ypersele, 1979b). 
The Exchange Rate System 
The exchange rate system in the EMS specifies a band or margin, 
around bilateral central rates, within which market rates are free to 
move. The band is 2.25 percent on either side of the central rates 
for all EMS currencies except the Italian lira, which may move 6 
percent on either side of its central rate and pound sterling which 
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float freely against ' 1 aL,_ other currencies. (The United Kingdom, whilst 
participating in the EMS viewed as a whole, decided not to take part 
in the exchange rate at their outset.) The parity grid matrix, Tables 
VII and VIII, show the upper and lower intervention points for each 
pair of currencies. When the market rate for any currency pair reaches 
its limit, the two central banks must intervene to keep it within the 
band. 
For example, assume the Belgian Franc has a tendency to fall below 
the bottom of its band vis-a-vis the German mark, i.e., below lBF 
.06099 DM. That means the German mark has a tendency to rise above 
the top of its band vis-a-vis the Belgian Franc, i.e., to rise above 
lDM = 16.3955 BF. In order to keep the market rate within the band 
both central banks must intervene, by selling D.M for BF, when the rate 
reaches its limit. Intervention is also allowed before the limits 
are reached, and such intervention, in principle, will be made in 
participating currencies, but intervention in dollars or in a third 
currencies is not excluded. However, when intervention points defined 
by the fluctuation margins are reached, intervention in participating 
currencies is compulsory (Costerg and Tardy, 1979). 
In theory, the arrangement permits the rate between each pair of 
currencies to move through a maximum range of 4.5 percent. But there 
is very little chance that in practice any country could make full use 
of this 4.5 percent range in a short period of time. If DM and BF are 
at their bilateral central rate, one currency could appreciate 2.25 
percent vis-a-vis the other before either central bank would be 
obliged to intervene in DN or BF. But before that full range is 
traversed, it is likely that one or both of the currencies would reach 
its respective limit against a third currency (Congress of the United 
States, Joint Economic Committee, 1979). 
TABLE VII 
THE ORIGINAL PARITY GRID, MARCH 13, 1979 
DM FF BF L DK Fl IP 
DM 2.3521 16.074 485.576 2.8866 1.10835 .269937 
2.3095 15. 7164 457.314 2.82237 1.0837 .263932 
2.2581 15.3665 430.698 2. 7596 1.0596 .25806 
FF . 4Li285 6. 96 210.252 1.24985 .4799 .116881 
.432995 6.80512 198.015 1.22207 .469235 .114281 
.42335 6.65375 186.49 1.1%9 .4588 .111739 
BF .06508 .15029 30.8961 . 183665 .07052 .0171755 
.0636277 .146948 29.0979 .179581 .0689531 . 016 7931; 
.06221 .14368 27.4044 .175585 .06742 .0164198 
L .002322 .005362 .03549 .006553 .002516 .000612801 
.00218668 .00505013 .0343668 .0061716 .0023697 .000577135 
.002059 .004756 .032365 .005813 .00223175 .000543545 
DK .36235 .8369 5.695 172.045 .3927 .0956424 
.3511313 .818286 5.56852 162.033 . 38396 7 .0935147 
.34645 .8801 5.44!t5 152.605 .375425 .0914343 
Fl .94375 2 .1796 14.8325 448.074 2.66365 .249089 
.922767 2.13113 14.5026 421.995 2.60439 .243548 
.90225 2.0838 14.18 397.434 2.54645 .23813 
IP 3.875 8.9495 60.9020 1839.78 10.9365 4. 1995 
3.78886 8.75034 59.5471 1732. 7 10.6935 4. 10597 
3.705 8.5555 58. 2225 1631.85 10.4555 4.0145 
Source: Congress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, 1979, p. 36. 
Note: DM = Deutsche Mark; FF = French Franc; BF = Belgian Franc; L = Italian Lira; DK = Danish Krone; 
Fl = Dutch Guilder; and IP = Irish Pound. 
,.._, 
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TABLE VIII 
THE REALIGNED PARITY GRID, SEPTEMBER 24, 1979 
DM FF BF L DK Fl IP 
--
DM 2.4093 16.3955 495.287 3.0309 1. 1305 .27553 
2.35568 16.0307 466.46 2. 96348 1.10537 .26921 
2.3033 15.6740 439.312 2.8976 1.080775 .26323 
FF .43415 6.96 210.252 1. 2866 7 .4799 .116881 
.4245 6.80512 198.015 1. 25801 .469235 .114281 
.41505 6.65375 186.49 1. 230012 .4588 .111739 
BF .0638 .15029 30.8961 .189072 .07052 .0171755 
.06238 .146948 29.0979 .18486 .0689531 .0167934 
.06099 .14638 27 .404l1 .18075 .06742 .0164198 
L . 002276 .005362 .03649 .0067457 .002516 .000612801 
. 0021L14 .00505013 .0343668 .0063531 .0034697 .000577135 
.002019 . 001+ 756 .032365 .0059834 .00223175 . 0005!'3545 
DK .3451 .813 5.5325 167.13 .381475 .092909 
.337441 .794906 5.40942 157.403 .372998 .0908426 
.32995 . 7772 5.289 148.242 .3647 .088822 
Fl .92525 2. 1796 14.8325 448.07l1 2.74198 .249089 
.90467 2.13113 14.5026 421. 995 2.68093 • 23!.1 SL18 
. 881+55 2.0838 14.18 397.434 2.6214 .23813 
IP 3.799 8.9L1')S 60.9020 1839.78 11. 2585 4.1995 
3. 71!,6 8.75034 59. 54 71 1732.7 11.00805 4 .10597 
3.632 8.5555 58.2225 1631.85 10. 76322 4.0145 
Source: C0n2,ress of the United States, Joint Economic Committee, 1979, p. 37. 
Note: DM = Deutsche Mark; FF = French Franc; BF = Belgian Franc; L = Italian Lira; DK = Danish Krone; 
Fl = Dutch Guilder; and IP = Irish Pound. 
,__. 
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The parity grid described above is simple and unambiguous. The 
important point is that the responsibility for intervening in the 
exchange .rate markets is shared by at least two countries (a weak and 
a strong currency country) rather than resting with one country alone. 
(Assuming that there is no neutralization policy, this by itself helps 
the convergence of inflation rates at the Community average.) 
The European Currency Unit 
The European Currency Unit (ECU) like the Special Drawing Right 
(SDR) of the International Monetary Fund is a basket of currencies, 
containing specific amounts of the nine member currencies. The amounts 
of each currency and their relative weights in the original ECU basket 
are shown in Table IX. 
TABLE IX 
THE AMOUNTS AND RELATIVE WEIGHTS OF EACH CURRENCY IN THE ECU 
Currency Amount Weight 
Deutsche Mark .828 33.02 
French Franc 1.15 19.89 
Pound Sterling .0885 13.25 
Dutch Guilder .286 10.56 
Italian Lira .109 9.58 
Belgian Franc 3.66 9.23 
Danish Krone .217 3.10 
Irish Pound .00759 l. ll 
Luxenbourg Franc .14 .35 
Sources: Van Ypersele (1979b, p. 16); Costerg and Tardy (1979, p. 10). 
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The value of an ECU, therefore, is .828 DM plus 1.15 FF plus .0885 
pound sterling, and so on. To calculate the value of ECU in terms of 
any single currency, convert the specific amounts of all the currencies 
in the ECU into that one currency. 
The amounts or weights of currencies in the ECU are subject to 
change by unanimous agreement of the member governments. The ECU has 
four· functions: (1) It serves as the denominator (numeraire) for the 
exchange rate mechanism; (2) as the basis for the divergence indicator; 
(3) as the denominator for operations in both the intervention and the 
credit mechanisms; and (4) as a means of settlement between monetary 
authorities of EC. 
As a numeraire, the ECU is used to define the bilateral central 
rates. If the ECU is defined, that is, specific amounts of each 
currency are chosen to compromise an ECU, and if the bilateral central 
rates are established first, then the ECU central rates are determined. 
For example, the ECU central rate for DH is determined by converting 
the specific amount of each currency in the ECU into an equivalent of 
DM, using bilateral central rates to make the conversion, then adding 
those DM to the .828 DM component of the ECU. The result is 1 ECU 
2.48557 DM. The establishment of bilateral central rates and the 
definition of the ECU, therefore, imply a specific set of ECU central 
rates. If, instead, ECU central rates are established first, one can 
derive bilateral central rates directly from them, without any 
reference to the definition of the ECU. 
For example, assume we have the following ECU central rates: 
ECU = 2.5 DM; 1 ECU = 6 FF; and 1 ECU = 40 BF. Then by division we 
can derive, for example, the deutsche mark-Belgian Franc bilateral 
central rates as: 1 DM = 16 BF or 1 BF = .0625 DM. Therefore, 
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bilateral central rates can be calculated for each pair of currencies 
from ECU central rates, or ECU central rates can be derived from 
bilateral central rates and the definition of ECU. The EMS arrangement, 
as well as much of the literature on EHS, speaks of bilateral central 
rates being derived from ECU central rates. 
The second function of the ECU is its role as an indicator of 
divergence in int er a-EC-currency relationships. As Thygesen (l 979a) 
points out, although this role of the ECU was watered down considerably 
in the course of the ENS negotiations, it is sti11 the most significant 
move towards a more communitarian system visible in the ENS. 
As market exchange rates fluctuate daily, the market determined 
ECU value of each currency fluctuates, given a set of ECU central 
rates, the difference hetween the market ECU value of each currency 
and its ECU central rate reflects that currency's divergent indicator. 
When a currency's divergent indicator passes a specified "threshold", 
the issuing central bank is expected to intervene or take other action 
to counter the divergence. If one currency is at its upper (lower) 
intervention limit simulatneously against all the other participating 
currencies, then it is at maximum divergence from its ECU central 
rate. The specified threshold is fixed at 75 percent of the maximum 
divergent so that it may alarm an early warning. 
In the parity grid, if currency A is at the top of its band 
against currency B, then B will be at the bottom of its band against 
A; therefore, both central banks are obliged to jntervene. This 
symmetry does not hold for an ECU system; currency A may reach its 
threshold of divergence a~ainst its ECU central rate without any 
other currency moving ouU;idc its reo;pective threshold of divergence. 
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The importance of the divergence indicator is that it is an objec-
tive indicator or a trigger for policy coordination. It is a trigger 
for policy coordination because it signals to the country whose policies 
are out of step with the majority of EHS members to bring its policies 
into line with those of other members. 
As Thgesen (1979b) points out, the resolution of the European 
Council on Dec.ember 5, 1978, states that: 
when a currency crosses its threshold of divergence, 
this results in a presumption that the authorities 
concerned will correct this situation by adequate measures, 
namely, (a) diversified intervention; (b) measures of 
domestic monetary policy; (c) changes in central rates; 
and (d) other measures of economic policy. In case such 
measures, on account of special circumstances, are not taken, 
the reasons for this shall be given to the other authorities, 
especially in the 'concertation between central banks' 
(p. 111). 
As Thygesen (1979b) points out: 
..• this sounds vague in a double sense: (1) the nature 
of the adjustment is not well defined, indeed, it is not 
mandatory to take action at all; nnd (2) it is very 
difficult to assess a priori how of ten currencies will in 
practice reach their ECU threshold. Yet this flexibility 
may be a considerable asset, by enabling the EMS to 
modify and sharpen its procedures if and when the need 
arises (pp. 111-112). 
The need to coordinate national monetary policies to manage the 
EMS has certainly been recognized at the official level, but it has 
not been reflected in any formal decisions (Thgesen, 1979b). The 
theoretical and empirical considerations developed in Chapters IV and 
V of this research suggest that if the EMS is to represent a step 
forward towards the establishment of conditions leading to a zone of 
monetary stability and, eventually, to European monetary unification, 
the emphasis must be on coordination of national monetary policies. 
This in turn suggests a clear adjustment action in the ECU system when 
a currency crosses the threshold of divergence, namely, measures of 
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monetary policy in the divergent country so as to bring its monetary 
policy into line with those of other members. In this way the 
divergence indicator as a trigger for policy coordination should become 
mainly a divergence indicator as a trigger for monetary coordination. 
Beyond its numeraire and divergent indicator functions, the ECU 
also serves not only as the denominator for operations in both the 
intervention and credit mechanisms, but also as a means of settlement 
between monetary authorities of the EC. 
In stabilizing the bilateral exchange rates in the parity grid, 
central banks are required to intervene in mew.her currencies rather than 
in dollars. Since, however, central banks do not in general accumulate 
member currencies as reserves, such interventions require mutual credit 
operations between the two central banks concerned. Central banks 
grant each other through the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) 
unlimited very short-term financing for their interventions and 
short-term monetary support, which can be supplemented further by 
medium-term financial assistance, granted by the Council under appro-
priate conditions (Triffin, 1980). The ECU is used as a unit of 
account in these interventions and credit mechanisms. 
To serve as a means of settlement, an initial supply of ECUs will 
be provided by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund against each 
central bank's deposit of 20 percent of its gold and 20 percent of its 
dollar reserves on a three-month swap. The ECU, however, can be used 
to settle claims between Community central banks only with a 50 percent 
limit at the creditor's option. For any portion not settled in ECUs, 
the general rule is to settle in reserve components jn the same 
proportions as those in vl1ich the debtor central banks hold its 
reserves, gold, however, being excluded. 
The European Monetary Fund and 
Present Credit Mechanisms 
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The present credit facilities involve three mechanisms: (1) the 
very short-term financing facility; (2) the short-term monetary support; 
and (3) the medium-term financial assistance. 
Apart fro1n the increase in duration and size, these mechanisms are 
taken over by the EMS from the old snake. 
The very short-term financing is available to EMS members accepting 
the intervention obligations of the parity grid in unlimited amounts. 
The claims and obligations resulting from these interventions normally 
should be settled 45 days after the end of the month during which the 
intervention took place. (Extensions are, however, possible.) 
The short-term monetary support and the medium-term financial 
assistance were expended as can be seen from Tables X and XI at the 
start of the EMS (Padoa-Schioppa, 1980). 
The Resolution of the European Council of December, 1978, called 
for the creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) to replace the 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund. The aim is to consolidate the 
credit mechanisms into a single fund in the final phase of the EMS. 
It shall evolve to supra-nation monetary authority for the Community 
with power to create new international reserves. 
Summary 
The European Monetary System consists of a parity grid within 
which bilateral market rates are permitted to move 2.25 percent on 
either side of their central rates. W-iile pegged tightly to each other, 
the EMS currencies float as a group against other currencies. When one 
TABLE X 
INCREASE IN THE SHORT-TERM MONETARY SUPPORT 
(MILLION ECUs) 
Quotas 
Debor 
---- ----
Creditor 
Oid New ·Old New 
Bank National de Belgique 200 580 400 
Denmarks National Bank 90 260 180 
Deutsche Bundesbank 600 1740 1200 
Banque de France 600 1740 1200 
Central Bank of Ireland 35 100 70 
Banca d'Italia 400 1160 800 
Nederlandsche Bank 200 580 400 
Bank of England 600 1740 1200 
Total Quotas 2725 7900 5450 
Source: Padoa-Schioppa (1980' p. 321). 
TABLE XI 
INCREASE IN MEDIUM-TERN FINANCIAL ASSISTA.i~CE 
(:MILLION ECUs) 
Belgium/Luxembourg 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Source: Padoa-Schioppa (1980, p. 322). 
Old 
400 
180 
1200 
1200 
70 
800 
400 
1200 
Commitment Ceilings 
1160 
520 
3480 
3480 
200 
2320 
1160 
3480 
---
15800 
New 
1035 
465 
3105 
3105 
180 
2070 
1035 
3105 
currency reaches its upper (or lower) limit against another, and 
necessarily t11e other reaches its lower (or upper) limit against the 
first, the authorities in both countries are obliged to intervene to 
prevent their currencies moving outside their permitted range. 
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Since the automatic working of the parity grid mechanism does not 
necessarily produce the desirable policy adjustments, it is supplemented 
by policy rules linked to the ECU; a threshold of divergence has been 
defined. This is where a currency's market value against the ECU 
diverges from its central ECU rate by more than 75 percent of the 
agreed maximum margin of fluctuations (also expressed in ECU). This 
crossing of the threshold of divergence will trigger automatic inter-
ventions or at least consultation on a possible need for policy 
coordination. 
The Resolution of the European Council in Brussels states that the 
authority of the divergent currency is expected to correct this situ-
ation by (1) diversified intervention, (2) rr,easure of domestic monetary 
policy, (3) changes in central rates, and (4) other measures of economic 
policy. 
Since the empirical findings in this research seem to support the 
monetary nature of the exchange rates, our recommendation for a 
divergent currency is very clear, namely, measures of monetary policy 
(inflationary policies in the case of a strong currency and deflationary 
in the case of a weak one) so as to bring its monetary policy closer 
to the other members. 
On the other hand, it may be argued that some kind of flexibility 
is needed for an ambitious design like EMS, so that, although this 
research emphasizes cornplusory monetary measures for a successful 
functioning of the E:,rs, it does not rule out the use of other policies, 
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such as changes in central rates or other measures of economic policy 
as is recommended in the Resolution of the European Council in Brussels. 
To enable countries with limited reserves to support their 
currencies, a system of bilateral and multinational credit has been 
devised. It is hoped that these credit arrangements will be consoli-
dated under the management of a European Monetary Fund with the power 
to create new international reserves. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUV.1.HARY AND CONCLUS IO?:iS 
Although the origins for some sort of European union are fairly 
distant, it is only after the Second World War that a great progress 
has been made. Negative integration--the removal of discrimination 
between the economic agents of the member cmmtries--was virtually 
completed by July, 1968. 
By 1970 a first step toward positive inte~ration--the formation 
and application of coordinated and common policies in order to fulfill 
welfare objectives--was made by the introduction of The Werner Report 
which called for the establishment of an Economic and Monetary Union 
(EWJ) by the end of 1980. But 1980 has come and gone without an 
economic and monetary union of nine EC member states. However it is a 
mistake to assert that further progress toward EMU is a remote 
prospect. 
The purpose of this research has been to evaluate the potential 
costs and benefits of using a "monetarist" strategy to help clevelop-
· rnent toward full economic union. The "monetarist" strategy emphasizes 
a quick introduction of monetary union among countries aiming at 
economic union in order to minimize the inefficiencies inherent in the 
use and control of money within the union and foster the drive toward 
a full economic union. An important clement of a monetary union is 
the fixity of excl1a11gc rates within the t.'n:ion, and from a technical 
point of view, it is not a matter whether the currencies of the member 
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countries, which form the monetary union, are retained or whether they 
are replaced by a new common currency. 
The benefits and costs of monetary union are described in Chapter 
III, the most important benefits seem to be: (a) it contributes to 
economic union, and thereby improves the allocation of economic 
resources; (b) it reduces or even eliminates the uncertainty in the 
fluctuation of the exchange rates among national currencies of the 
members of the union, thereby, reducing the cost of information about 
exchange rates an<l exchange market prospects and transaction costs and 
hopefully encourages trade among participating men1bers. 
The main cost of a monetary union seems to be the sacrifice of 
domestic economic objectives. Keynesian economists argue that the 
imposition of some sort of fixed exchange rate among member states 
results in the loss of control over the money supply for individual 
member countries, which, prevents them from each attaining their 
optimum combination of :Lnflation and unemployment on the so-called 
Phillips Curve. According to the critics of the "monetarist" strategy, 
this results in a higher rate of unemployment in some member states 
which would not be acceptable to them. 
This study maintains that the above objection to a "monetarist" 
strategy to help d~veloprnent toward full economic_union is, 
economically, weak. 
To show that the real cost of using a "monetarist" strategy for 
relatively open economies of member states is small, we have used the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments theory. Two versions of 
a simple monetary approach to exchange rate determination have been 
developed and estinated. The empirical evidence pJ·esented in tbis 
study suggests t11at exchange rates are mainly monetary phenomena and 
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that exchange rate ch:mges mainly affect money prices, and have no 
lasting effects on employn~nt. 
An implication of the results derived in this study is that to 
maintain fixed exchange rates, the participating members should mainly 
aim at ex ante harmonization of their monetary expansion. This ex ante 
harmonization, of course, limits the monetary independence of national 
economies; but since the monetary approach of exchange rate determina-
tion follows from two theories, namely the domestic monetary theory of 
the price level and the purchasing power parity theory of the exchange 
rate, any empirical support for the monetary approach of exchange rate 
determination is also, but implicitly, an empirical support for the 
domestic monetary theory of the price level. Therefore this study also 
supports the domestic monetary tenet that monetary policy mainly 
affects the price level and has no lasting effect on employment. In 
other words, the results in this study support not only the monetary 
nature of the exchange rates but also the lack of a trade-off between 
inflation and employment for individual member countries. 
In view of the above, this research maintains that the cost of 
the loss of national control over the money stock (unemployment) is 
very small and negligible after a year. Given the sizeable benefits 
resulting from monetary union, we believe that there is a strong case 
·for a quick introduction of monetary union in the community. 
Another implication of this study concerns the successful 
functioning of the European Monetary System. Although the prime 
objective of the EMS seems to be to increase monetary stability in the 
community, it cannot be confined to that. It is also a basic strategy 
designed to f~cilitate tl1c co~vergcace of economic dev0lopment and 
therefore assist in giving fresh impetus to the process of European 
Union. To be successful, the EMS, first of all, will have to be. 
accompanied by policies designed to achieve greater convergence of 
national monetary policy. 
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In summary, the results of this study are important for both 
theoretical and policy purposes. Monetary union, which represents an 
intermediate stage, is still far from complete. A major stride in that 
direction requires closer coordination of the monetary policies of all 
the Member States. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE HISTORY OF THE SHORT-TER..'1 MONETARY SUPPORT 
UP TO THE CREATION OF E}1S 
Countries 
Quotal 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherland 
BLUE2 
U.K. 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Total 
Unity 
Extension 3 
TABLE XII 
THE HISTOln OF TiiE SHORI-Tfa~}l NONETARY Sl1PPORT 
ur TO THE CREATION OF EMS 
Fr..>rn 9-2-70 
To 7-1-73 
Debtor 
Quota, 
300 
300 
200 
100 
100 
1000 
million 
1000 
$ 
Period 
From 7-1-73 
To 17-2-7!1 
Debtor 
Quota 
300 
300 
200 
100 
100 
300 
45 
17.5 
1362.5 
million units 
of account 
1362.5 
On or After 
18-2-74 
~~~~~~- -~~~~~ 
Debtor 
Quota 
600 
600 
400 
200 
200 
600 
90 
35 
2725 
million units 
of account 
1500 
Creditor 
Quota 
1200 
1200 
800 
400, 
400 
1200 
180 
70 
5450 
million units 
of account 
Source: Dersch, Hichiels and Louis (1977, p. 65). 
1Quota = Contribution of each central bank Automatic Drawing. 
2Belgium/Luxembourg (one single central bank). 
3conditional drawing, above the individual quota. 
Example: Italy could get a total credit (quota and available 
extention) of $1200 from 9-2-70 to 7-1-73; of 1562.5 million units 
of account from 7-1-73 to 17-2-74, which she actually obtained, and 
of 1900 million units of account since the 18-2-74. 
APPENDIX B 
BIOGRAPHY OF THE ATTEMPTS TOWARD MONETARY UNION 
Date 
1968 - 1969 
August 1969 
October 1969 
February 1970 
October 1970 
February 1971 
May 1971 
August 1971 
December 1971 
April 1972 
May 1972 
June 1972 
October 1972 
January 1973 
March 1973 
April 1973 
June 1973 
September 1973 
January 1974 
September 197Li 
March 1975 
Crisis 
Financial crisis 
in France 
The D.M. crisis 
End of the gold 
convertibility 
Sterling crisis 
$-D.M. crisis 
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Proposition and Decision 
Devaluation of French franc. 
Revaluation of German mark. 
Agreement between central banks for 
short-term monetary support. 
Proposal by Werner Group on imple-
mentation by stagep toward EMU. 
Agreement on the implementation of 
the first stage. 
The D.M. and guilder were floated 
jointly. 
Italian lira was floated. France 
and Belgium adopted a two-tier 
market. The commercial B.F. joined 
the D.M. and guilder. 
Smi~hsonian Agreement (realignment 
and increased margins of fluctua-
tions). France and Belgium 
maintained their two-tier market. 
Basle Agreement, Snake in the Tunnel 
is lau11ched; participants: Beligurn, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands 
U.K., Denmark, and Ireland join. 
U.K., Ireland, and Denmark leave the 
snake. 
Denmark returns. 
Italy withdraws and adopts two-tier 
market. 
The snake leaves the tunnel (joint 
float). U.S., Ireland, and Italy 
continue to float independently; 
D.M. revalued by 3 percent. 
Establishment of European Coopera-
tion Fund. 
D.M. revalued by 5.5 percent. 
Guilder revalued by 5 percent. 
France leaves the snake. 
Fourcacle Plan. 
M.:irjolin Report. 
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Date Crisis Proposition and Decision 
·~~~~~~- -~~~~ 
July 1975 
November 1975 
October 1976 
April 1976 
October 1977 
October 1978 
December 1978 
September 1979 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
france rejoins the snake. 
Duisenberg Proposa'l. 
The Danish krone devalued by 6.5 
percent, the guilder and B.F. by 
2 percent. 
Danish krone devalued by 3 percent. 
Jean Monet lecture by Roy Jenkins 
in Florence. 
The D.M. is revalued by 4 percent, 
the guilder and B.F. by 2 percent. 
Establishment of EHS. 
Technical readjustment within the 
EMS. 
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The following summary of the spectral theory is taken from 
Granger and Hatanka (1964) and Chatfield (1975). 
It is usual to atter.ipt to explain the properties of a stationary 
stochastic process in terms of its autocovariance (or autocorrelation) 
function. In spectral anGlysis the uatura] tool for considering the 
frequency properties of a time series is the spectral density function. 
If we suspect that a time series contains a periodic component at 
a known frequency, then the natural model is 
R Cos(wt + 8) + Z 
t 
(1) 
where w is called the frequency of the periodic variation, R is called 
the amplitude of the variation, 8 is called the phase, and Z denotes 
t 
some stationary random series. w is called the angular frequency, but 
in keeping with most authors we will simply call w the frequency. 
However, some authors refer to frequency as 
f = w 
21T 
= the number of cycles per unit of time 
The period of a sinusoidal cvcle, called the wavelength, is 21T or _fl • 
, w 
If the series is suspected to contain periodic component corre-
spon<ling to several different specified frequency, say, w1 , w2 , ... wk, 
then it is natural therefore to generalize (1) to: 
k 
L: R. Cos(w.t + 8.) + Z 
. 1 l l l t i= 
(2) 
Letting k -+ 00 , it can be shown thcit (2) may be represented in the form: 
x 
t 
!TI !TI Cos wt du(w) + 
0 0 
Sin wt dv(w) 
where u(w) 2nd v(w) are r~mdorn co11ti1wo-us process with uncorrelated 
(3) 
increments. Equation (3) is called the spectral representation of the 
real valued processes. More generally, all stationary processes (real-
valued or complex-valued) can be represented in the form 
JTI itw e dZ(w) (4) 
-TI 
where X(w) is a complex random function called a process of non-
correlated increments such that: 
0 
= dF(w) w 
An important theorem in spectral analysis says that the sequence 
of autocovariances µ for a stationary process can always be repre-
t 
sented in form 
Jn itw e dF(w) 
-n 
or if the process is real-valued, in the form 
Jn 2 Cos t w dF(w) 
0 
(5) 
(6) 
F(w) has a direct physical interpretation, namely, it is the contribu-
tion to the variance of the series which is accounted for by frequencies 
in the range (0,w), and is called the spectral distribution function. 
Its derivative with respect to w is called spectral density function 
or simply the spectrum: 
f (w) (power) spectral density iunction 
The physical meaning of the spectrum is that f(w)dw represents the 
contribution t:o varL.:nce of components \!;th frequcncic<; in the range 
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(w,w+dw). A peak in the spectrum indicates an important contribution 
to variance at frequencies in the appropriate region. 
Replacing dF(w) by f(w)dw in (5) and (6) results is: 
!TI itw e f(w)dw (7) 
-TI 
JTI 2 Cos t w f(w)dw 
0 
Estimation of the Spectrum 
From the relationship for real, stationary process (8), the 
inverse relationship is given by 
00 
f(w) 1 (µ0 + I µ. Cos j w) 2TT J J=l 
(8) 
(9) 
so that for a finite amount of data {x , t 
t 
1, 2, ... , m} a sensible 
estimate would appear to be 
f(w) 
1 n-1 
Zn (c0 + 2 I 
J=l 
C. Cos j w) 
J 
where the estimated covariances, C., are given by 
J 
(10) 
1 n-j 
CJ. = -. Z (Xt - X) (Xt+J· - X) (11) 
n-J t=l 
It is possible to partition the variability of a series into components 
;i,t different frequencies; if we plot the contribution of each component 
to the variance against different ranges of frequencies we obtain the 
periodograrn, represented by 
I(w) 
1 rn-1 
2n (Co + 2 L: 
J=l 
C. Cos j w) 
J 
(12) 
Therefore it appears that the periodograrn is the obvious estimate of 
the power spectrum. However, it can be shown that the periodogram is 
asymptotically unbiased but is not a consistent estimator for f(w). 
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The ~ailure of the periodogram as <1n estimate.. for the power 
spectrum has led to consideration of estimates of the form 
f(w) 
1 m-1 
2n {C0A0 + 2 ~ !... C. Cos j w} 
J=l J J 
(13) 
where !... are a set of weights called the lag window, and m < n is called 
J 
the truncation point. 
The above mP.thod is based on transforming the sample autocovariance 
function. A considerable amount of discussion has occurred in deciding 
how to choose the weighting factors!.. .. An alternative method, also 
J 
used in this research, is to smooth the periodogram by simply grouping 
the periodogram ordinates in sets of siz m and finding their average 
value. There is little advice in the literature on the choice of m. 
It seems advisable to try several values, in the region of n/40. 
Cross-Spectral Analysis 
For a univariate process, the moment up to second order are the 
mean and autocovariance function. For a bivariate process, the moments 
up to second order consist of the mean and autocovariance functions 
for each of the two process plus a new function, called the cross-
covariance function. For a real bivariate random process {X , Y } the 
t t 
spectral representation is given by 
µ (t) 2 rrr Cos t w f (w)dw (14) 
xx 0 x 
µ (t) 2 !TI Cos t w f (w)dw (15) yy 0 y 
)l ( t) !TI itw Cr(w)dw (16) = e 
xy 
·-1T 
Equations (14) and (15) are spectral representation of autoco-
variance functions of the processes {X } and {Y } respectively. 
t t 
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Equation (16) is the spectral representation of the cross-covariance 
function between {Xt} and {yt}. f (w) and f (w) are the power spectra 
x y 
of the processes {Xt} and {yt} respectively and 
Cr(w) c(w) + iq(w) (17) 
is known as the power cross-spectrum between {X } and {Y }; c(w) is 
t t 
knwon as the co-spectrum and q(w) as the quadrature spectrum. 
00 
c(w) 1 µ (0) +l " {i1 ( t) + ]J ( t ) } Cos t w (18) 2TI '-' xy 1T t=l xy yx 
00 
q(w) 1 E { p (t) - p (t)} Sin t w (19) 
TI t== 1 xy yx 
A useful function derived from the cross-spectrum is the coherence 
which is given by 
C(w) 
2 2 
c (w) + q (w) 
f (w) f (w) 
x y 
(20) 
The coherence is essentially the square of the correlation coefficient 
between corresponding frequency components of Xt and Yt, and it can be 
shown that 
0 _::. C(w) < 1 (21) 
As with the power spectrum, there are two basic approaches to 
estimating the cross-spectrum. One is based on transforming the sample 
cross-·covariance function and the second approach is to smooth a 
function called the cross-periodogram, the later method is used in 
this study. 
Summary 
Cross-spectral technique is a method for examining the relationship 
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between two series over a range of frequencies. The col1erence measures 
the correlation beLween two series at each frequency and is analogous 
to the square of trio usual correlation coefficient. It is the natural 
measure of the extent to which two variables are related. 
APPENDIX D 
DATA SOURCES 
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] 51, 
The data utilized in this study are, for the most part, taken 
from various issues of the International Financial Statistics. The 
exact sources of the data used are given below. 
Exchange Rates 
All exchange rates are taken from various issues of the IFS (line 
rf). The IFS expresses the exchange rates in U.S. dollars per national 
currency unit or vice versa. By a simple division we obtained the 
exchange rate between any two European countries. 
Consumer Price Index 
All consumer Price Indixes are taken from various issues of the 
IFS (line 64, 1970=100). 
Money Supply 
The money stocks are all taken from various issues of the IFS 
(line 34) except for Belgium, which are taken from the OECD 1 s Main 
Economic Indicators. 
Index of Industrial Production 
Industrial production indices are taken from various issues of 
IFS (line 66, 1970=100). 
Real Gross Domestic Product 
For France, Germany and United Kingdom, the real gross domestic 
product are taken from various issues of the OCED's Quarterly National 
Account Bulletin (1970=100). Italy 1 s real gross domestic product arc 
presented in Table XIII ~tich were kindly supplied by Banca d'Italia. 
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Discount Rates 
All discount rates are taken from various issues of the IFS (line 
60). 
Government Bond YielG 
All government bond yields are taken from various issues of the 
IFS (line 61). 
Year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
TABLE XIII 
ITALY'S QUARTERLY REAL DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(1970=100, BILLIONS OF LIRE) 
I II III 
16,821 17,399 18,013 
18,550 18,615 18' 1,1_,3 
17,721 17,520 17,650 
18,357 18,661 18,796 
19,354 19,025 19,016 
19,352 19,437 19,585 
20,357 20,218 
IV 
18,368 
17,517 
17' 960 
19,197 
19,040 
20,114 
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